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INTRODUCTION
In 2001, there were 149 million Internet users in the United
States and 544 million worldwide.1 This number is projected to
increase to 186 million and 945 million, respectively, by 2004; and
230 million and 1.47 billion, respectively, by 2007.2
Since only 9.5 million homes have high-speed Internet access,
it can be inferred that the majority of these users are operating, at a
maximum, with 56k modems.3 Without broadband, 4 it takes
1

See Internet User Forecast by Country tbl. 1.4, at http://www.eTForecasts.com/
products/ES_intusersv2.htm (last modified Dec. 7, 2002).
2
See id. tbl. 1.1 (demonstrating an average increase of about twenty percent per year
worldwide).
3
See Pamela McClintock, Valenti Sees ‘Peril’ in U.S. Copyright Fight, DAILY
VARIETY, Mar. 4, 2002, at A9 (noting that Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the Motion
Picture Association of America [MPAA], estimates that only 9.5 million homes have
high-speed Internet access).
4
Broadband is defined by the U.S. Federal Communications Commission [FCC] as a
service that offers more than 200 kbps in any one direction. See F.C.C., INQUIRY
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between twelve and fourteen hours to download a full-length
feature film, so at the present time it is not entirely feasible for the
majority of users to rent films over the Internet.5 With broadband,
however, it takes as little as twenty-five to thirty minutes; in the
future this figure should decrease to a mere forty-five seconds.6
Additionally, Qualcomm is developing the technology and
establishing a uniform standard to link computers to television sets
so that consumers will be able to watch downloaded videos on
their home theater systems instead of their computer monitors.7 In
only a few years, most netizens8 will be renting videos over the
Internet to watch on big screen TV.
But who will provide the service? How much will they
charge? And, most importantly for the film industry, how will the
revenues be determined for profit participants? These are some of
the most critical questions facing today’s entertainment attorney,
and their resolution surely will be the subject of hotly contested
litigation in the not-too-distant future.
Part I of this Article defines profit participation and argues that
in-house Internet home video distribution will deprive writers,
directors, producers, and actors (hereinafter cumulatively “Talent”)
of their earnings because studios surely will use biased reporting
procedures. Part II examines the basis for this bias by discussing
how studio in-house Internet home video distribution may
eliminate the independent reporting procedures of content
aggregators. This section compares the efficiency and desirability
of traditional distribution models to the new Internet model, and
argues that although there is a reasoned economic need for such

CONCERNING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ADVANCED COMMUNICATIONS CAPABILITY TO ALL
AMERICANS IN A REASONABLE AND TIMELY FASHION, AND POSSIBLE STEPS TO
ACCELERATE SUCH DEPLOYMENT PURSUANT TO SECTION 706 OF THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT OF 1996, THIRD REPORT 7–8 (2002), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-02-33A1.pdf.
5
See McClintock, supra note 3.
6
See id.
7
Gary Garland, Address at the 26th UCLA Entertainment Law Symposium (Jan. 25,
2002).
8
People who use the Internet. See Netizen, Netlingo at http://www.netlingo.com/
right.cfm?term=netizen (Netizen: “A citizen of the Internet, as in, one who spends a
significant amount of time online or is an experienced user of the Net.”).

8 - GATIEN FORMAT

2003]

5/12/03 8:52 AM

INTERNET VIDEO DISTRIBUTION AND PROFITS

913

distribution, it will be prejudicial to profit participants who should
protect themselves through the following alternatives: independent
auditing, litigation, or collective bargaining that mandates
arbitration. Additionally, the government must vigorously enforce
antitrust law, because the recent trend of vertical integration by
large media companies has deprived profit participants of
meaningful negotiating power and the ability to collect their
contractual earnings. Part III further discusses the antitrust
implications of this new video distribution model and argues that
in-house studio distribution of home video will be anathema to the
sound public policy of protecting weaker bargaining parties and
ensuring that contracting parties receive the benefit of their
bargain. Part IV discusses how Internet distribution threatens both
studios and profit participants by making videos vulnerable to
widespread piracy, with the resulting losses surely passed on to
profit participants. This Article concludes that fundamental
change is necessary in order to protect profit participants from the
potential abuse that in-house Internet distribution of home video
presents to film studios.
I.

TALENT PARTICIPATIONS DEFINED

In the entertainment industry, Talent creates works for hire that
a studio owns, and for which “they are paid fixed and contingent
compensation.”9 The principal form of contingent compensation is
the profit participation provision.
The modern version of the profit participation began in 1950,
when Hollywood went from a “studio system” of weekly player
contracts, or per-picture salaries, to percentages of so-called
“profit” pools.10 At that time, Jimmy Stewart agreed to forego his
fixed compensation for Winchester ’73, in exchange for a “backend” (after the film is released) profit participation of fifty percent
of the net profits resulting from the studio’s exploitation of the
film. Unfortunately, the film was not a commercial success and

9

BILL DANIELS ET AL., MOVIE MONEY 211 (1998).
Id. at 202 (quoting Mel Sattler, former head of Universal Studios’s business affairs
department).
10
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Mr. Stewart received no money for his work.11 Initially, then, the
earliest form of a profit participation was a venture in which Talent
alone shouldered the risk when the film failed, but was wellrewarded when it succeeded.
Since that time, profit participation has evolved into a sum
granted in addition to fixed compensation. Therefore, studios now
bear more of the risk, because they must pay the fixed
compensation even if a film fails, and they must share their profits
if the film succeeds. Talent, however, still bears some risk because
Talent will often accept a lower fixed salary up-front for a larger
slice of the profits on the back-end. Consequently, figures such as
Mr. Stewart’s fifty percent profit participation share no longer
exist. The norm for current profit sharing provisions varies
between one and fifteen percent depending upon the Talent’s
ability to draw an audience.12
This mutual risk arrangement is designed to produce mutual
reward, but does it? In the film industry, modern profit
participation provisions are formulaic and often attached to
agreements as the studio’s Exhibit “A.” Although the terms are
boilerplate, or standard, the provisions are actually creatures of
contract. Typically, parties exercising independent will and free
choice negotiate contractual provisions; however, this is not the
case in an industry where only seven key players control the purse
strings.13 In such a restrictive environment, contractual provisions
are rarely, if ever, negotiated, and any alterations will result from
the Talent’s relative bargaining strength.14
Nevertheless, profit participations are highly desirable because
they confer bragging rights upon the Talent who receive them,
enabling them to reap future windfalls that can be worth millions if

11

See id. at 202–203.
See id. at 204. Ironically, profit participations only go to the most powerful Talent,
usually the top five percent of all working actors; however, one definition of a net
participant is one who “wishes they had more leverage.” See id. at 297.
13
The seven major studios are Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc., Paramount Pictures
Corporation, Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., Twentieth Century Fox Film
Corporation, and Universal Studios Inc., Walt Disney Company, and Warner Brothers.
See MPAA, at http://www.mpaa.org/about/index.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
14
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 208, 211–12, 226.
12
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the motion picture becomes a commercial success.15 Since Talent
wants profit participation, and entertainment attorneys spend
endless hours agonizing over how profit participation is defined, it
is necessary for an entertainment attorney to have a proper
understanding of the terms and drafting. Here are a few of the
fundamentals.
A. Net Profits: The Big Picture
Talent participation is based on net profits. Net profits are not
mandated by statute, as are tax calculations,16 or agreed upon by
the guilds, as are residuals.17 Net profits, like Talent participations,
are creatures of contract.18 There are essentially four definitions of
studio net profits: (1) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
(GAAP), for reporting earnings to the SEC, shareholders, and
lenders; (2) calculating income and loss for tax reporting to the
Internal Revenue Service; (3) calculating cash available for
distribution to equity holders of the film company, and (4)
calculating payments to profit participants.19 In their simplest
form, each accounting method essentially boils down to the
following model: gross revenues – (distribution fees + distribution
expenses + negative cost) = net profits.20
B. Net Profits: Breakout
1. Gross Revenues
Gross revenues are all revenues received from a film in all
media, minus off-the-top expenses such as (1) conversion costs,21

15

See id. at 210–11, 249.
See SCHUYLER M. MOORE, THE BIZ 120 (2000).
17
See, e.g., WRITERS GUILD OF AM., THEATRICAL AND TELEVISION BASIC AGREEMENT
art. 65, at 350–96 (1998).
18
See MOORE, supra note 16.
19
See id. at 117–22.
20
See id.
21
Bank costs incurred when converting foreign currency into domestic currency. See
DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 231.
16
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(2) theater checking,22 (3) collections,23 (4) residuals to talent
guilds,24 (5) trade dues,25 (6) licenses,26 (7) taxes,27 and (8) theaterlevel advertising.28
2. Distribution Fees
Distribution fees are the fees charged by the studio/distributor
to distribute a film in a given territory. These fees are usually
charged as a percentage of revenue from the designated market and
vary between ten and fifty percent depending on the producer’s
relative bargaining power.29
3. Distribution Expenses
Distribution expenses are the costs associated with distributing
a film. Distribution expenses include, to relative degrees, each of
the following: advertisements and promotions,30 release prints,31

22
To ensure accurate box office reporting, studios hire theater checkers to actually sit
in the theater and do a head count. See, e.g., Certified Reports, Inc., at http://www.
certifiedreports.com/TheatreServices.asp (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
23
The cost of collecting fees from and auditing distributors. See DANIELS ET AL., supra
note 9, at 231.
24
Talent guilds include the Directors Guild of America [DGA], Screen Actors Guild
[SAG], and Writers Guild of America [WGA], though residuals are also payable to
below-the-line (everyone other than the director, writer, producer, or star) guilds such as
the International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees [IATSE], under various
collective bargaining agreements. See id. at 162–66, 232.
25
A trade is an organization, such as the MPAA, responsible for protecting and
promoting the interests of an industry. They do so by lobbying for protectionist
legislation, especially in regard to antitrust matters, discussed infra Part III. Their fees
are subject to a cap of $75,000. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 232.
26
Fees, including censorship payments to foreign film boards. See DANIELS ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 232.
27
Revenue taxes including foreign withholding taxes. See id. at 232–33.
28
This is a typical studio “give,” meaning it will be negotiated out if requested. See id.
at 230–33.
29
See id. at 295.
30
Recent totals for advertising and promotion: 1997 (22.7 million), 1999 (28 million),
2001 (30 million). Studios define this term broadly, including:
Advance screenings, market research focus groups, and market tracking
studies;
Network television (the most expensive part of the ad campaign, the cost of
which local exhibitors do not share);
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taxes,32 residuals,33 bad debt,34 and other miscellaneous expenses
such as editing costs due to censorship, duties, theater checking,
special titles, legal expenses, and settlements.35

Cooperative advertising (ad costs shared by the distributor and exhibitor which
are negotiable, and may include all media, some media, or only in-theater
standees (standing cardboard figures));
Trade Ads (ads taken in trade magazines such as the Hollywood Reporter or
Daily Variety, which are used to stroke Talent egos, attract foreign distributors,
get exhibitors to increase bids for films, and drive up the secondary market
price of a film);
Four Walling (releasing film theater-by-theater rather than according to a
general release plan);
Sneak Previews (such previews include the director’s sneak (for which the
producer and distributor must agree in accordance with standards set by the
DGA), the trade sneak (done mostly for Talent ego and sales, as described
above for Trade Ads), and the word- of-mouth sneak (to generate enthusiasm
among fans);
Advance Ads (ads that do not include theater names, merely the title of film or
star);
Theater Ads (including trailers, marquee, standees, and one sheets);
Billboards and Busses;
Publicity (otherwise known as the art of coaxing media into promoting for free,
though a studio may have to pay for Talent to go to a publicity screening
(including hotel, air fare, car rentals, and per diem)), or for field promotion
(where the studio pays the salaries of fieldpeople (independent agency
employees, or employees of the distributor in charge of “local publicity”)
which are separately chargeable, while ad personnel’s salaries usually are not).
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 142–43. Publicity may also include
featurettes, otherwise known as Electronic Press Kits [EPKs], that show how
the film was made. Revenue generated from EPKs should be offset against
charges, but this is generally not done because it would be difficult and costly
for the profit participant’s auditors to locate;
Overhead (most distributors charge ten percent of total ad expense as a
contractual overhead amount).
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 113–47; MOORE, supra note 16, at 343, 360–61.
31
The cost of release prints includes the film elements, the freight, and dubbing costs.
Generally, costs incurred prior to the final answer print are considered production costs
(subject to an overhead charge), while costs incurred afterward are considered
distribution expenses. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 149–54; MOORE, supra note
16, at 362.
32
Income taxes are not chargeable to a production, though the studio may charge sales,
withholding, and remittance taxes. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 155–60; MOORE,
supra note 16, at 137, 362–63.
33
Residuals are a distribution expense, triggered only if a film is distributed beyond its
initial theatrical release. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 161–66; MOORE, supra note
16, at 362.
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4. Negative Cost
The negative cost is the cost of getting the film “in the can”
(i.e., completing the film up through obtaining a final cut negative,
but not including release prints, which are more properly deducted
as a distribution expense).36 Another way of looking at negative
cost is to view it as the final production budget of the film, after
adjustments for actual costs.
Negative costs include, but are not limited to, the production
cost,37 studio overhead of roughly fifteen percent of the direct cost
of production, gross participations before breakeven (i.e., when
gross receipts = distribution fees + distribution expenses +
production costs + interest), interest (usually charged at 125
percent of the London InterBank Offered Rate (LIBOR), and
which may be added on to overhead and also charged against
unrecouped production costs, but not unrecouped distribution
expenses), and deferments (which may be contingent (on profits)
or non-contingent (upon completion of principal photography or
upon acquiring a distributor).38 The important distinction for profit
participants between distribution fees and distribution expenses is
that the studio may charge overhead on distribution costs, but not
on fees, and this interest charge is always higher than the actual
cost of funds.39 Profit participations are also included as
production costs so that the studio may charge interest and the
overhead fee on them to deduct these charges before making any
payments.40

34
Bad debt is an uncollectable film rental fee, and should generally not be reported as a
distribution expense. See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 168; MOORE, supra note 16, at
362.
35
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 169–70; MOORE, supra note 16, at 360–64.
36
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 153.
37
Including (1) the cost of abandoned ideas, (2) facility charges for use of studio back
lots and production offices, (3) payroll tax and fringes varying between twenty-five and
forty percent of the salaries of studio and guild employees (and which studios will
calculate at the highest rate even though actual amount paid is less), and (4) completion
guarantees between three and six percent of the budget (if necessary). See DANIELS ET
AL., supra note 9, at 179–90.
38
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 190–200.
39
See MOORE, supra note 16, at 138.
40
See id.
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C. Net Profits: Two Models for Home Video
Net profits for home video are determined on either a license
fee or a royalty model.41
1. The License Fee Model
The license fee model follows the traditional net profit formula
discussed supra Part I.A.1: gross profits – (distribution fees +
distribution expenses + negative cost). Typically, studios will levy
a distribution fee between thirty-five and forty-five, which is
similar to a theatrical distribution fee.42
2. The Three Royalty Models: Sell-Through, Revenue Share,
and Rental
Royalty models are a convenient means by which a studio can
get around the myriad deductions of the License Fee model by
simply reporting to the profit participant a flat percentage of gross
income from wholesale distribution.43 At some point in every
case, varying with the numbers, the license fee model and royalty
model for home video will meet;44 profit participants should,
therefore, hire a savvy attorney who is adept at choosing which
model will produce the most income.
Royalty models for video distribution fall into three categories:
sell-through, revenue share, or rental.45 Given that the intention of
a studio is to calculate and report net profits as low as possible, it is
not surprising to find that studios have defined royalties in terms
that allow them to categorically reduce gross receipts from video
sales, the single largest element of gross receipts, by eighty percent
or more.46

41

Wayne Levin, Address at Southwestern University School of Law (Feb. 2002).
See id.
43
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 296.
44
A good rule of thumb is somewhere between a thirty-seven percent royalty and a
twenty-two percent distribution fee.
45
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 61–62.
46
See MOORE, supra note 16, at 135.
42
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a) Sell-through
Sell-through defines the market in which the studio delivers
videocassettes to retail outlets for sale directly to consumers at the
manufacturer’s suggested retail price (approximately $29.95).47
Royalties in this market are the lowest and vary between ten and
fifteen percent.48
b) Revenue Share
Revenue Share defines the market in which videos are
delivered to retailers at a reduced price and in which the gross
profits are split fifty-fifty with the studio, which allows for a
slightly higher royalty of approximately eighteen percent.49
c) Rental
Rental is the market in which videos are sold to retailers for
rental to consumers in exchange for a higher royalty of
approximately twenty to thirty percent.50
3. Conclusion: The Three Royalty Models Underscore the
Need for Accurate and Enforceable Reporting at a Higher
Royalty Rate
The current royalty models effectively allow a studio to take a
seventy-five to ninety-five percent distribution fee without
accounting for costs.51 While this fee was initially fair, because
higher royalties were needed to help pay for developing and
marketing a new secondary market, they are now onerous and
excessive because all the associated costs have decreased, lowering
the cost of duplicating, marketing and distributing a video cassette
from forty dollars to three dollars.52 The studios, however, cling to
47

See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 62.
See Harris E. Tulchin, Licensing Motion Pictures in the International Marketplace,
at http://www.medialawyer.com/LICEART.htm (1999).
49
See WAYNE LEVIN, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION LAW 32 (2002).
50
See Tulchin, supra note 48.
51
The distribution fee is essentially the reverse of the royalty fee, i.e., when the
distributor pays a royalty of between eight and twenty-five percent, she is, in effect,
charging a distribution fee of between seventy-five and ninety-two percent.
52
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 65.
48
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these antiquated standards for three reasons: first, because they
can; second, because increasing the royalty for one retailer would
likely increase the royalty for all based on “most favored nations”53
provisions in standard distributor contracts; and third, because of
concerns that higher royalties will incur higher across-the-board
payments to guilds.54 To aggravate matters further, distribution
expenses are now creeping back in, reducing the royalty even
further to approximately eight to twelve percent, regardless of the
model chosen.55
II.
THE ECONOMICS OF INTERNET VIDEO DISTRIBUTION: TWO
WAYS IN WHICH INTERNET DISTRIBUTION WILL AFFECT PROFIT
PARTICIPANTS
Internet distribution presents a monolithic problem for the film
industry, and for profit participants and their attorneys, because it
is not clear to anyone drafting these agreements exactly where
Internet revenue will fall under current guild agreements.56 One
certainty, however, is that the Talent’s share of profit participation
will be reduced in two ways. First, when studios take distribution
“in-house” (meaning they do it themselves) there will be little, if
any, independent oversight, which will lead to under-reporting.
Second, when films are distributed online they will be increasingly
vulnerable to piracy, with the resulting losses surely passed on to
profit participants in the form of write-downs.

53

See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 64 n.15 (“A ‘most favored nations clause’ . . .
basically states, ‘if anyone else ever gets a better deal, then I get that same better deal.’”).
54
See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 64.
55
See id. at 66–68.
56
See Zane B. Melmed, The Role of the Studio Lawyer in the New Media Age, 8 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 169, 178 (2001).
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A. How In-House Studio Distribution of Home Video May
Eliminate the Need for Content Aggregators and Lead to
Underreporting
1. The Traditional Home Video Distribution Model
Under the traditional home video distribution model, content
aggregators57 distributed videos to the public. Content aggregators
include businesses such as Blockbuster Entertainment, Hollywood
Video, and neighborhood video stores, which receive and
distribute videos from multiple sources.
2. Benefits of Content Aggregators: Independent Reporting
Content aggregators provide multiple consumer benefits: a
wide range of films (not just films from one studio), geographical
proximity and convenience, and competitive prices. For Talent,
the most important benefit of content aggregators is that they
provide independent reporting of gross receipts,58 because content
aggregators are not exclusive distributors of a single studio’s
product.59
3. Detriments of Content Aggregators: Increased Cost
Studios dislike doing business with content aggregators, but
view them as necessary evils. First, content aggregators are
necessary because consumers will not drive to different studio
stores, where each store carries only that studio’s films.
57
“A content aggregator is an individual or organization that gathers Web content
(and/or sometimes applications) from different online sources for reuse or resale.”
Content Aggregator, Search Web Services, at http://searchwebservices.techtarget.com/
sDefinition/0,,sid26_gci815047,00.html (last visited Apr. 16, 2003).
58
Although detailed reports are available by paid subscription only, limited reporting
of gross receipts for video rentals is available to the public through Hollywood Reporter,
at http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hollywoodreporter/charts/rental_display.jsp (last
visited Apr. 16, 2003) (listing of weekly top ten available without paid subscription),
Video Store Magazine, at http://www.videostoremag.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2003)
(listing of weekly top ten available without paid subscription), and Video Business, at
http://www.videobusiness.com (last visited Apr. 16, 2003) (listing of weekly top three
available without paid subscription).
59
This is true even though they may be owned by a single studio; e.g., Blockbuster and
Paramount are both subsidiaries of Viacom.
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Consumers would not know where to go, making it extremely
inconvenient for them to find movies, and the selection would be
limited. Second, content aggregators are evil, as far as studios are
concerned, because they increase the studios’ cost of doing
business and lower the studios’ profit margin. Content aggregators
increase the studios’ cost of doing business by imposing
independent reporting and auditing requirements, and they lower
the studios’ profit margins because studios must split profits under
the revenue sharing models discussed supra in Part I.C.60
4. Why Content Aggregators May Be Eliminated
Much to the studios’ delight, Internet video distribution
threatens to abolish the need for content aggregators because it will
radically change the way consumers rent motion pictures. Instead
of going to local video stores, consumers will be able to do a title
search on the web, go to the studio website, and download the film.
Portal sites61 may also allow a user to select films according to
genre and then link to a studio site, in which case a studio would
likely pay the website between one and thirty cents for referrals
leading to consumer rentals.62
Clearly, content aggregators will seek to continue distributing
films online. Although initial efforts to start an Internet venture
between Blockbuster and Enron failed,63 Blockbuster has had some
success in securing limited video-on-demand rights from
Universal.64 Furthermore, Blockbuster’s president of e-commerce
has stated that Blockbuster is firmly committed to “deliver[ing]

60

See David Bloom, Blockbuster and Enron Blow Out, Red Herring, at
http://www.redherring.com/industries/2001/0326/1730018373.html (Mar. 26, 2001)
(“Blockbuster . . . generates more than half of Hollywood’s domestic income.”).
61
A site that aggregates links to other sites and allows users to hyperlink to those sites.
62
This estimate is based on current search engine models such as Overture.com.
Overture.com is premised on a unique business model, whereby advertisers bid for key
words such as “tee shirt,” and the highest bidder receives priority ranking in the listings.
See http://www.overture.com/d/USm/about/news/glance.jhtml (last visited Feb. 19,
2003).
63
See Bloom, supra note 60.
64
See Cecily Barnes, Blockbuster Rolls Film on Video-on-Demand, CNet News, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-253242.html?tag=bplst (Feb. 27, 2001).

8 - GATIEN FORMAT

924

5/12/03 8:52 AM

FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J.

[Vol. 13:909

movies to people at home however they want to receive them.”65
With this hope in mind, Karen Raskopf, a spokeswoman for
Blockbuster, stated “[w]e are continuing to talk with the studios
and no studios have told us no.”66
However, not saying “no” doesn’t mean “yes,” especially when
the stakes are as lucrative as the $18 billion video rental market.67
In fact, initial discussions between Blockbuster (eighty-two percent
owned by Viacom)68 and its corporate cousin Paramount Studios
(also owned by Viacom)69 failed when the parties couldn’t agree to
a deal, with one insider stating that “Hollywood isn’t about to give
Blockbuster another blank check.”70
5. How Eliminating Content Aggregators May Affect Profit
Participants
Although this change in the distribution model may be
insignificant, if not more convenient, for consumers, it poses a
significant problem for profit participants who rely on the
independence of content aggregators’ accounting. If studios no
longer have to distribute films through content aggregators, they
will be free (1) to set the video rental price, (2) to set the video
royalty rate posted to gross receipts, and (3) to report the number
of videos rented.
The studios have already taken the initial steps. On November
11, 2002, five of the seven major film studios announced their joint
venture, Movielink71 (the antitrust implications are discussed in
Part III.B infra). Under the present model, a consumer can rent a
film online which will be viewable on his home computer for as
little as $1.99–$3.99 per picture for up to one month; however,
once the film has been started, it is only available for twenty-four
65

Top 25 Click and Mortar Executives, Internet World, at http://www.internetworld.
com/magazine.php?inc=060100/6.01cover2.html (June 1, 2000).
66
Reuters, Studios in Talks to Sell Movies on the Web, Industry Standard, at
http://www.thestandard.com/article/0,1902,20510,00.html (Nov. 30, 2000).
67
See Bloom, supra note 60.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
See http://www.movielink.com (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
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hours before it is permanently erased.72 Most likely as a result of
piracy fears (discussed in Part IV infra), the studios are initially
releasing slightly more than 170 titles.73
Because of the present technological inability of average
consumers to watch the films on television, and also the competing
video-on-demand and DVD markets, immediate criticism has been
leveled at this means of distribution.74 That said, the studios hope
this arrangement will prove attractive because of the low cost, ease
of use, and absence of late fees.75
Experts have speculated that the most probable model will be
either direct distribution or an inter-company license through a
closely held affiliate.76 Direct distribution will give the studios
ultimate authority over the rates, as well as how receipts are added
and reported. This presents the problem, however, of “at source”
reporting. “At source” reporting occurs when income is recorded
where it is received. In other words, if a studio receives the money
directly, then it must calculate the amount owed to profit
participants and post it directly into gross receipts without any

72

See Chris Marlowe & Paul Bond, Studios Unreeling Web Distrib’n: Quintet
Movielink Bows Today Amid Mixed Expectations, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 11, 2002, at 8
(noting that studios generally set prices at about $4.00); Dawn C. Chmielewski, Major
Studios to Launch Net Movie Rentals, Mercury News, at http://www.siliconvalley.com/
mld/ siliconvalley/4492236.htm (Nov. 11, 2002) (“Pricing and terms are set by individual
studios, with rental fees ranging from $1.99 to $4.95.”).
73
See id.
74
See Marlowe & Bond, supra note 72 (quoting Mark Kersey, broadband analyst for
ARS, Inc., as stating that “Internet movies-on-demand will remain a niche market for the
foreseeable future,” and quoting Josh Bernoff, Forrester Research principal analyst, as
stating that linking television to a wireless network “is just too much tinkering for Joe
Sixpack”); Ben Fritz, The Next Big Internet Flop, Slate, at http://www.msnbc.com/
news/834034.asp (Nov. 12, 2002) (“The press clippings had better be glowing, because
as a business, Movielink provides a product for which there is almost no demand.”).
75
Cf. Risky Business? New On-Demand Digital Movies May Not Be Pirate Proof,
TechTV, at http://abcnews.go.com/sections/scitech/DailyNews/techtv_digimovie010820.
html (Aug. 20, 2001). Recently, Blockbuster has implemented a new plan aimed at
encouraging more rentals by reducing late fees, allowing customers to pay a subscription
fee between $19.99 and $24.99 per month for unlimited rentals. See Stefanie Olsen, CNet
News, Blockbuster Takes Aim at Netflix, at http://news.com.com/2100-1023-949024.html
(Aug. 8, 2002).
76
See Schuyler M. Moore, Release of Films on the Internet Gives Rise to Novel Legal
Issues, ENT. L. & FIN., Dec. 1999, at 3.
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further deductions. This would result in more money for profit
participants and less for the studio.
Therefore, it is more likely that studios will distribute through
an inter-company license with a wholly-owned subsidiary. This
model gives the appearance of propriety while still allowing the
studios to legally redistribute profits to their affiliate, and away
from profit participants, by entering into agreements that favor
their affiliate-licensees. Under this model, the “source” is the
affiliate, not the studio, and thus more deductions can be taken
before posting earnings from Internet distribution to gross
receipts.77
This granting of rights among closely held corporations occurs
now more than ever, as vertically integrated studios create their
own programs and then license and distribute them through
affiliates.78 It has caused an industry-wide panic among Talent and
Talent representatives, because it allows the licensee (which has no
contractual obligation to Talent) to earn the lion’s share of the
profits while the studio posts reduced figures to the profit
participation pool shared by Talent, thus permitting a studio to
legally avoid its contractual obligation to share profits.79
One result of this pro-studio/anti-Talent licensing scheme was
the high-profile failure of a proposed NBC sitcom because its
producer could not ensure a fair market return on the series.80 In
that dispute, Adam Sandler’s Happy Madison production company
pulled out of negotiations with NBC for its Norm Macdonald–Jon
Lovitz buddy comedy because Sandler couldn’t prevent the studio
from cutting a sweetheart affiliate deal that would diminish his
profit participation windfall if the sitcom became successful.81 At
the heart of the dispute was the studio’s recent revision in its
77

See id.
See John Dempsey, April Fills Cablers with Ratings Thrills, VARIETY, May 6–12,
2002, at 36 (quoting Brad Adgate, senior vice president and director of research for
Horizon Media: “Vertical integration has changed the model. It’s not broadcast vs. cable
any more, it’s media conglomerate vs. media conglomerate.”).
79
See Janet Shprintz, Self-Dealing Sets Backend Furor, VARIETY, Sept. 20–26, 1999, at
4.
80
See Cynthia Littleton, Self-Dealing Pains TV Biz: Talent, Studios Battle Over BackEnd Deals, HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 21, 2001, at 1, 41.
81
See id.
78
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contractual language, replacing the studio’s obligation to secure
fair market value for the program with a provision to negotiate in
good faith.82 This alteration was based upon the studio’s unilateral
assessment that “fair market value is a difficult, if not impossible,
standard to determine in the current media landscape, where media
giants are doing more and more internal business and the pool of
potential buyers is shrinking.”83 However, such a provision
effectively eviscerates the rights of profit participants because it is
so subjective. Essentially, the studio replaced a standard that was
difficult to determine with one that was wholly unenforceable
without litigation, and solely within its discretion.
NBC has since revised this provision to stipulate that the studio
must “secure fees in line with the amount the studio would in a
transaction with an unaffiliated buyer for a comparable
program.”84 However, under the current trend of deregulation, it is
not likely that such a value could be determined, because nearly all
studios are licensing to affiliated companies.85 Therefore, this
form of self-dealing through transfer pricing in affiliated
transactions is an industry-wide issue that has become “grist for
numerous lawsuits in recent years as consolidation and vertical
integration [have] yielded media behemoths that house production
and network entities under one corporate roof.”86
So far, the lawsuits that have been filed against the studios
have settled87 based upon the studios’ fear that they would be
required to disclose their confidential license fee agreements.88
Nevertheless, settlements only protect Talent powerful enough to
sue without fearing that a backlash from the studio might end their
82

See id.
Id. at 41.
84
Id.
85
See Shprintz, supra note 79.
86
See Littleton, supra note 80, at 1.
87
See id. at 41 (citing lawsuits against Twentieth Century Fox TV over profits from the
shows NYPD Blue and The X-Files based on licensing arrangements between Fox
Broadcasting Co. and its FX cable network; a lawsuit by Barry Levinson and Tom
Fontana over profits from Homicide: Life on the Street; and a lawsuit by the creators of
Home Improvement).
88
See id. (stating that studio executives equate discovery with blackmail because
plaintiffs can subpoena confidential license fee agreements).
83
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career.89 Furthermore, studios are already nipping lawsuits in the
bud by inserting new contractual language effectively spelling out
the rights of the studio to sell to an affiliate, as well as engage in a
self-dealing transaction, with all disputes subject to mandatory
binding private arbitration.90 This is hardly a solution to the
problem, since private arbitration will keep disputes out of the
public eye, limit discovery, and not be subject to appeal.91
If past behavior is any indication, studios will neither be honest
nor forthcoming when providing statements to profit participants.92
89

See id. (quoting veteran entertainment litigator Stanton “Larry” Stein, who stated
“most of the talent involved just doesn’t have the clout to say ‘no’ because they won’t get
their projects picked up”).
90
See Shprintz, supra note 79.
91
See MOORE, supra note 16, at 188.
92
Some noteworthy examples of Hollywood’s untrustworthiness are:
• In November 2002, the California Court of Appeals let potentially devastating
jury instructions stand following appeal by the Walt Disney Company. See
Stephen Slesinger, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., No. B153920 , 2002 WL 31590870
(Cal. Ct. App. filed Nov. 20, 2002); Janet Shprintz, Winnie Ruling Wallops
Disney, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 21, 2002, at 1, 24. The case involved damages that
could amount to $1 billion resulting from Disney’s promise to pay videocassette
royalties to the Slesinger family, which has held North American rights to Winnie
the Pooh since the 1960s. The court found that “Disney misused the pretrial
discovery process by destroying evidence it knew or should have known was
sought by SSI [including a file marked “Pooh-Legal Problems”], making false and
evasive responses to SSI’s discovery, and unduly delaying notification about the
records destruction.” Slesinger, 2002 WL 31590870, at *2. Consequently, by
applying a jury instruction “as to the suppression, concealment, and destruction of
evidence”, the court let stand jury instructions permitting the jury to find that the
representations regarding royalties had been made, that Disney was prohibited
from introducing evidence disputing SSI’s version of statements attributed to
Disney, and allowing the jury to find that such representations were knowingly
false when made. Id. Notwithstanding Slesinger, Disney had the chutzpah to
separately negotiate an agreement with the heirs of the Pooh books author and
illustrator in a move that would allow Disney to reclaim the merchandising rights
from the Slesinger family—this agreement is being separately contested. See
Shprintz, supra at 79.
• In November 2002, legendary comic book creator Stan Lee filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of New York because Marvel Comics
claimed that, despite the $800 million in worldwide box office sales, SPIDER-MAN
(Columbia Pictures 2002) had not generated a profit. See Carl DiOrio, Lee’s
‘Spider’ Suit: Case vs. Marvel Turns on Licensing Profits, DAILY VARIETY, Nov.
13, 2002, at 8.
• In 1995, Winston Groom, the writer of FORREST GUMP (Paramount Pictures
1994), publicly complained that Paramount had not paid him a single penny of his
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Commenting on the creative practices underlying “Hollywood
Accounting,” one industry insider has said his mentor at
“Universal kept no fewer than five sets of books for any given
production,” while another swears with equal vehemence that
Universal kept “only a single set of books . . . for any given
purpose.”93 Semantics aside, the principal question that taking
video distribution in-house poses to profit participants and that
Talent will litigate in the near future will be “how can a profit
participant prevent the underreporting problem that Internet
distribution poses?”94
B. How Can Profit Participants Prevent Underreporting?
1. The Independent Audit
As a matter of course, studio profit participation statements are
audited by profit participants with clout in the film industry,
because “participants generally don’t trust the good graces of the

93
94

three percent net profit participation after the film had grossed over $660 million
worldwide to become one of the best selling films of all time. See Kim Masters,
Hollywood Is As Hollywood Does:’Gump’ Author Nets Success, Not Big Bucks,
WASH. POST, May 27, 1995, at C1. The studio later placated the author by paying
him one million dollars for the film rights to his next book. See Paul F. Young et
al., Par Buys ‘Gump’ Book Sequel, VARIETY, June 19–25, 1991, at 19.
• In 1995, the heirs of Jim Garrison, the late New Orleans district attorney who
wrote On the Trail of the Assassins, upon which the Oliver Stone film JFK
(Warner Bros. 1991) was based, sued Warner after the film earned over $150
million in gross receipts, but failed to show a net profit. Garrison v. Warner Bros.,
Inc., 1996 WL 407849 (9th Cir. 1996). A detailed synopsis of the case and
pleadings can be found at Garrison v. Warner Brothers, at
http://www.courttv.com/legaldocs/business/ garrison.html (last visited Feb. 8,
2003).
• In 1982, Art Buchwald, an internationally renowned writer and humorist, sued
Paramount Pictures, including then head of motion picture production, Jeffrey
Katzenberg, for stealing his three-page screen treatment entitled It’s a Crude,
Crude World and turning it into COMING TO AMERICA (Paramount Pictures 1988).
At the time, Katzenberg had a high regard for the concept as a movie, describing
it as “a succinct, smart, straightforward idea with a lot of potential to it” which he
apparently had no compunction stealing. See Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures
Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 1990).
DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 212–13.
Moore, supra note 76.
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distributor to ensure that their interests are being looked after.”95
Similar practices are rampant in the recording industry, where
many labels are owned by the same principal entities.96 Though
audits are often the only realistic remedy for curing suspected
reporting errors, they are often ineffective because standard
contracts allow the studios to approve of the auditor.97 This
permits the studios to choose an auditor favorable to their interests,
and release only limited records of the film company, as opposed
95

DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 271.
See Tamara Conniff, Artists Sing Protest Songs: Labels Upbraided at State Hearing
on Accounting, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 25, 2002, at 1, 31. This article is indicative of
the widespread dissatisfaction of artists with accounting practices. It begins by stating
that “audits are a luxury only top-selling artists can afford, leaving many midlevel acts
without any means of being properly compensated.” Id. at 31. Noteworthy quotations
include: (1) Don Henley, recording artist and founder of the Recording Artists Coalition,
vilifies the accounting practices of the five major record labels stating “[t]here is no
penalty for negligence and underreporting”; (2) Simon Renshaw, manager for the Dixie
Chicks, stating after a $20 million settlement that for every client he has represented with
respect to royalty payments in the last twenty years, the accounting has “always been
wrong, without exception”; (3) country recording artist Clint Black stating “I’m not an
accountant, [but I made] $150 million for the record company [and] I could not find
anyone in my organization to explain to me how [it] could be possible [that I owed them
money]”; (4) Kathryn Crosby, widow of Bing Crosby, stating “I can tell the difference
between 7% and 15%” resulting from millions of dollars in underpayments of royalties
dating from the 1940s; (5) Jennifer Warnes, Oscar and Grammy winning artist stating
that the royalty statements are “impossible to understand” and that the labels were
“dishonest and inaccurate”; and (6) Ruben Blades, actor and recording artist, stating that
the accounting procedures were a “bilingual rip-off.” Id. Interestingly, the response from
the labels was to try to minimize the gravity of the harm by (a) stating that settlements
accounted for only 4% of royalties earned (Paul Robinson, Senior Vice President, Warner
Music Group); (b) stating that artists earning 17% on revenue make more than labels
earning 9% on revenue (Linda McLaughlin, industry-hired economist); (c) accusing
artists of separatism and myopia—”fiddling while Rome burns” and stating that “[t]his
royalty reporting debate, however well-intentioned it may be, is distracting all of us from
the very pressing need to band together on . . . piracy, which is taking a huge toll on the
record business” (Paul Robinson); and (d) attacking the artists’ integrity, calling artists
“offensive and malicious to malign an entire industry based on stereotypes, innuendo and
myths” (Cary Sherman, President, Recording Industry Association of America [RIAA]).
Id. This author finds the industry’s arguments to be transparently inaccurate and selfserving because (a) 4% of royalties earned is no small amount when it totals in the
hundreds of millions of dollars; (b) incredibly few artists make more than labels, and,
even so, the artists deserve the money because it is their work and most have short
careers; (c) solidarity with respect to piracy has nothing to do with underreporting, and,
following the Rome analogy, if the artist is Caesar, “et tu Brute?”; (d) repeated specific
instances of underreporting are not stereotype, innuendo, or myth; they are reality.
97
See MOORE, supra note 16, at 139.
96

8 - GATIEN FORMAT

2003]

INTERNET VIDEO DISTRIBUTION AND PROFITS

5/12/03 8:52 AM

931

to their general ledgers or underlying contracts that would show
unreported income or rebates.98 Furthermore, an audit does not
give the profit participant the right to inspect the books of
affiliates, who may be sheltering income.99 Therefore, there is no
meaningful ability to cross-check amounts posted as income,
because the affiliates are not parties to the contract between the
studio and the profit participant. Additionally, auditors are
generally not given the right to copy documents (inhibiting full
review), Talent does not receive back interest on monies owed, and
Talent must pay for the audit, even in cases of gross undercompensation.100 Therefore, even though audits are common
practice, they are not an effective means of ensuring accurate profit
participation because they are based on insufficient information,
studios do not have to disgorge the interest on monies improperly
retained, and Talent bears the risk of paying for most audits
whether or not they are successful.
2. Litigation
Litigation is costly but quite effective, because the threat of
exposure through discovery often forces a studio to settle rather
than divulge confidential books that would reveal further abuses.101
If Talent possesses both the wherewithal and sufficient power to
prevent litigation from becoming career quicksand, this is probably
the most effective means for obtaining relief.
3. Guilds & Arbitration
Guilds are some of the most powerful forces in Hollywood.
One way that Talent could help ensure accurate reporting is to
have auditors appointed by the guilds, not the studios, or at least be
appointed in equal proportions. Another provision Talent could
include is to have any profit participation dispute subject to
binding arbitration by their respective guild representatives. While
such an appointment would clearly help protect Talent’s rights, it
98
99
100
101

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Littleton, supra note 80.
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may prove too cumbersome, because, again, the provisions are
bargained for, and thus not mandatory and subject to guild
agreements. In addition, Talent may elect “audit and arbitration,”
thereby over-taxing guild resources and creating further animosity
between guilds and studios which have led to tremendous work
stoppages102 and runaway production.103
4. Legislation
Talent may follow the lead of recording artists and push for
legislation that would establish statutory penalties for, or
criminalize, improper accounting practices.104
5. Establish a Fiduciary Duty
Talent may also wish to introduce legislation under state
business and professional codes to establish that breaching an
obligation to pay royalties breaches a fiduciary relationship.105

102

The WGA went on a twenty-two-week strike in 1998 leading to losses estimated in
the hundreds of millions of dollars and only questionable gains. See Dave McNary, Will
Biz Replay ‘88 Labor Bloodbath?, VARIETY, May 22–28, 2000, at 7. Thereafter, the
threatened writers strike of 2001 gave writers enough leverage to secure a three-year
contract, providing a $41 million gain when studios sought to prevent an estimated $6.9
billion dollar loss to the city of Los Angeles. Michael Mahern, a negotiator for the
WGA, described this gain as the “best economic package that the Writers Guild has
achieved since 1977.” See Hollywood Writers Clinch Deal with Producers, CNN, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/SHOWBIZ/TV/05/04/writers.guild.02 (May 4, 2001).
103
Runaway production (films shot outside Los Angeles) became one of the biggest
problems for guilds during the 1990s, as producers seeking to lower their film budgets by
avoiding onerous guild payments shot more and more films in Canada, Australia, and
elsewhere. Numerous articles belabor the labor and civic losses that result when films
are shot outside of Los Angeles. See James Bates, Marketing the State’s Virtues to
Filmmakers, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2002, at C1; Meg James, Valenti Says He’s Against
Tariffs; Entertainment: Film Industry’s Chief Lobbyist Tells Canadians He Supports Tax
Credits to Keep Production in U.S., L.A. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2002, at C4; Leaving Los
Angeles: Expo Highlights New Horizons: City Film Commissioners Unhappy with
‘Runaway Production’, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/2000/SHOWBIZ/Movies/02/29/
locations/index.html (Feb. 29, 2000).
104
See Conniff, supra note 96 (in which California Senators Kevin Murray, D-Culver
City, and Martha Escutia, D-Norwalk, announced that they may introduce such
legislation to help settle the “long simmering issue” of recording industry accounting
practices which has led to “a lot of angry [artists] out there”).
105
See id.
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6. Antitrust Law
Antitrust law focuses less on the agreements themselves than
on how the agreements are by-products of unequal bargaining
power between studios and Talent. In the context of in-house
Internet video distribution, the recent prevalence of entertainment
media mega-mergers threatens to abolish Talent profit
participation entirely because studios will most likely distribute
through closely held affiliates, thereby secreting profits into
companies with which Talent has no privity and therefore cannot
reach. This argument is more fully developed in Part III.
III.

PUBLIC POLICY: WHO BENEFITS AND SHOULD THEY?

A. Are Studios Unfairly Arrogating Profits?
As stated previously, profit participations are creatures of
contract, and every contract implies an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. Although studios will argue that contractual profit
participation provisions are entered into freely and knowingly by
willing parties represented by experienced lawyers, the truth is that
the definitions cannot be, and are not in fact, negotiated.106 It is,
therefore, even more critical that when a studio contracts with
Talent for profit participation, part of their contractual obligation is
to uphold their duty to report profits accurately and honestly so
that Talent will receive the benefit of their bargain. Traditionally,
however, this has not been the case.
1. Unequal Bargaining Power and the “Monkey Point”
Problem
Historically, the introduction of new technologies to the film
industry has operated to artists’ detriment.107 In 1960, the WGA
went on strike, insisting on artist royalties for films released on

106

See DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 211.
See Jeffrey K. Joyner, Future Technology Clauses: Would Their Lack of
Compensation Have Discouraged Shakespeare’s Creativity and Denied Society’s Access
to His Works in New Media?, 31 SW. U. L. REV. 575 (2002).
107
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television, and received non-retroactive compensation.108 In 1973,
the WGA again confronted the issue of profit participation with the
advent of home video.109 At that time, the WGA successfully
defined and set a participation standard for writers.110
Currently, new technologies are covered in “future media”
clauses, usually drafted as all media “now known or hereinafter
created.”111 The fundamental purpose of this clause is to have
Talent assign away their rights to profits from those media.112 The
fact that such a clause even exists in a Talent contract underscores
the plain fact that “there is unequal bargaining power between the
two sides [artists and studios] and the [artist] doesn’t feel as if he
or she can say no because their career is at risk if they do.”113
Furthermore, in Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., the
court noted that if Talent who lack “the ‘clout’ of major stars
[wish] to work in the film industry [they] must do so on terms
substantially dictated by the studio.”114 Since it is commonly
understood that 95% of all actors are non-working actors, it is selfevident that most of the industry’s Talent occupy weak bargaining
positions.115 Clearly, the implications are that since most Talent
are relegated to weak bargaining positions, their profit
participations will be minimal, and the realization of such profits is
108

See Dave McNary, Showbiz Faces Labor Pains, VARIETY, Mar. 27–Apr. 2, 2000, at

1.

109

In 1971, Sony invented the U-Matic video cassette recorder [VCR], beginning a
revolution in the secondary market for film distribution. See The Betamax Versus VHS
Battle, Jones Telecommunications and Multimedia Encyclopedia, at http://www.
digitalcentury.com/encyclo/update/sony.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
110
See 2001 Negotiations, Negotiations Alert, History: A Look Back: Progress and
Sacrifice, WGA West, at http://wga.org/negotiations/alert0700.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2003).
111
See Alex Alben, Future Technology Clauses and Future Technologies Legal
Roadblocks to New Media Uses Along the Information Super Highway, ENT. L. REP.,
Mary 1994, at 3, 11.
112
See id.
113
Dave McNary & Paul F. Duke, Rewriting the Rules: Writers Guild Fights Studios
over Draft Notices, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 28, 2000, at 12.
114
Michael Rudell, The ‘Buchwald’ Case–Phase 2, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 25, 1991, at 3 (citing
Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1497 (Cal. App. Dep’t
Super. Ct. 1990)).
115
Cf. McNary, supra note 113, at 12 (stating that there is unequal bargaining power
between writers and studios).
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considered illusory: what Eddie Murphy colloquially referred to as
“Monkey Points.”116 “Monkey Points” is an appropriate term,
because regardless of the apparent profitability of any particular
film, the studio invariably claims that the film was not
profitable.117 The “Monkey Point” problem is exacerbated by
vertical integration, a problem presented by both the direct and
inter-company in-house distribution models, which further exclude
the artist from gaining access to independent reporting sources.
B. Antitrust Implications?
1. Vertical Integration Prohibited
There were many important things happening in 1948. In the
film world, it was a “revisionist” period that reexamined and
reevaluated the Great American Dream. Jack Warner churned out
“gritty” realist social dramas at Warner Studios,118 catapulting
character actors like Humphrey Bogart119 and Bette Davis120 into
that rarefied realm of stardom previously reserved for matinee
idols such as Clark Gable121 and Claudette Colbert.122 In the realm
of politics, the nation was rebuilding. America had just emerged
116

DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 225.
See Masters, supra note 92 (Paramount claimed no profits after FORREST GUMP
(Paramount Pictures 1994) grossed over $660 million worldwide).
118
Jack Warner helped found Warner Brothers in 1923 with his brothers Harry, Albert,
and Sam. He was the head of Burbank Studios during its most popular era in the ‘30s
and ‘40s and sold his remaining interest in the studio in 1967 to a commercial syndicate.
See A Warner Brothers Retrospective, at http://www.meredy.com/warnerbros (last visited
Feb. 8, 2003).
119
Humphrey Bogart starred in TREASURE OF THE SIERRA MADRE (Warner Bros. 1948)
and KEY LARGO (Warner Bros. 1948).
120
Bette Davis starred in ALL ABOUT EVE (Twentieth Century Fox 1950), ANOTHER
MAN’S POISON (Image Entertainment 1952), and PHONE CALL FROM A STRANGER
(Twentieth Century Fox 1952) in the post-war years.
121
Clark Gable starred in IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT (Columbia Pictures 1934), MUTINY
ON THE BOUNTY (MGM 1935), IDIOT’S DELIGHT (MGM 1939), and GONE WITH THE WIND
(Selznick International Pictures 1939) during the pre-war years.
122
Claudette Colbert co-starred in IT HAPPENED ONE NIGHT (Columbia Pictures 1934)
with Clark Gable (which won an Oscar for best picture). She also starred in CLEOPATRA
(Paramount 1934), THE GILDED LILY (Paramount 1935), SHE MARRIED HER BOSS
(Columbia 1935), THE FASHION SIDE OF HOLLYWOOD (Paramount 1935), and IT’S A
WONDERFUL WORLD (MGM 1939) during the pre-war years.
117
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from one of the most devastating human tragedies on record, and
President Truman was busy restoring confidence to a nation that
had lost 295,000 lives to war.123 The exceptional productivity of
this time helped screen out the images of desolation left by the war
and gave Americans a forward looking optimism, which would
lead to the carefree idealism of the 1950s.
It was a period when the strong became stronger, yet a sense of
dignity and responsibility prevailed, set by Truman’s own moral
imprimatur as a former county judge.124 Equity was a central
concern of the Democratic Congress125 and the courts, and the
single most significant manner in which equity was applied to the
commercial world was through the Sherman Anti-trust Act of
1890.126
The Sherman Anti-Trust Act is a federal law prohibiting
“[e]very contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of
[interstate or foreign] trade . . . .”127 Its primary targets are
unlawful monopolies that impose unreasonable restraints on
trade,128 punishing unlawful monopolistic behavior with
imprisonment for up to three years, individual fines up to $350,000
per violation, and corporate fines up to $10 million per violation.129
The leading case of the post-war era to use the Sherman Act to
prevent unlawful monopolistic behavior in the entertainment
123

See World War II Fatalities, at http://www.stokesey.demon.co.uk/wwii/casualty.html
(last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
124
See FAQ: How Could Truman Be a “Judge” if He Did Not Graduate from Law
School?, Truman Presidential Museum and Library, at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/
trivia/judge.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
125
Part of Truman’s winning platform consisted of reducing the cost of government,
instituting stand-by wage price controls, promoting federal laws to end job
discrimination, decreasing taxes for low-income people, raising the minimum wage from
forty to seventy-five cents per hour, using federal funds to provide low-cost housing and
permanent price supports for farmers, and creating a national health program. See
Comparing the 1948 Platforms, Truman Presidential Museum and Library, at
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/1948campaign/large/docs/
student_activities/sta12-1.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
126
15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (2000).
127
15 U.S.C. § 1.
128
See generally BUTLER SHAFFER, IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE: THE BUSINESS CAMPAIGN
AGAINST COMPETITION, 1918–1938 (1997) (analyzing the issue of unfair competition).
129
See 15 U.S.C. § 1.
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industry was United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc.130 In
Paramount, the Supreme Court held the vertical integration of
production, distribution, and exhibition achieved by the five major
film studios to be an unlawful restraint on trade.131 The facts of the
case reveal that the studios had exerted their considerable leverage
in a concerted scheme of price fixing coupled with unreasonable
clearances to prevent competition by independent exhibitors.132
2. The Return to Vertical Integration
Since that landmark case was handed down, however, the
pendulum has swung in the opposite direction and, despite Judge
Richard Posner’s contention that “antitrust doctrine is supple
enough, and its commitment to economic rationality strong
enough, to take in stride the competitive issues presented by the
new economy,”133 courts have consistently ruled against finding
antitrust violations.134 This is true despite the fact that the Truman
administration would likely be shocked by the conglomerations of
vast amounts of power in the hands of very few modern media
giants today.
The purblind acquiescence of the executive, legislative, and
judicial bodies is unprecedented, and their fealty to the
corporations that assure their future livelihood cannot be
understated. Within the last ten years, Congress, the courts, and
administrative agencies have relaxed most restrictions on national
media ownership.135
The signs of re-integration were initially faint, but clear. In the
1990s, the legislature began to remove the restraints on vertically
integrated production, distribution and exhibition, effectively
130

334 U.S. 131 (1948).
See id.
132
See id. at 145–47.
133
Richard A. Posner, Address: Antitrust in the New Economy, Tech Law Journal, at
http://www.techlawjournal.com/atr/20000914posner.asp (Sept. 14, 2000).
134
See Lawrence A. Sullivan, Is Competition Policy Possible in High Tech Markets?:
An Inquiry into Antitrust, Intellectual Property, and Broadband Regulation As Applied to
“The New Economy”, 52 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 41, 61 (2001).
135
See Jerome A. Barron, Globalism and National Media Policies in the United States
and Canada: A Critique of C. Edwin Baker’s Media, Markets, and Democracy, 27
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 971, 980 (2002).
131
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overturning Paramount.136 In 1995, the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) eliminated the Financial Interest and
Syndication (hereinafter “Fin-Syn”) Rules.137 The Fin-Syn Rules
were designed to prevent major networks from distributing and
profit sharing in domestic syndication, and to restrict their
activities in foreign markets to distributing programs that they
exclusively produced.138 Critics have charged that “independent
and creative programming [have] been stamped out by the repeal
of fin-syn.”139 Over the next several years to the present, the FCC
eliminated most of the Chain Broadcasting Rules, which limited
the duration of affiliate agreements and the number of TV stations
a network could own, citing the high degree of competition
introduced by satellite, cable and videocassette.140
Then, in September 1999, the FCC eliminated the duopoly
rules in favor of a “waiver” system for the top television
markets.141 Previously, the duopoly rules prevented television
broadcasters from owning two of the top four stations in a single
market.142 Following this decision, however, media owners could
petition to own more than one station absent a showing of
prejudice against the minority owners.143
Finally, in February 2002, the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia struck down and remanded for reconsideration the
FCC rules limiting media ownership of television stations to thirtyfive percent of the national television audience, holding that such a
limit was “arbitrary and capricious and contrary to law.”144 The
136

United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
See T. BARTON CARTER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE FIFTH ESTATE 681
(5th ed. 1999).
138
See id. at 668.
139
Pamela McClintock, FCC Is Owning Up: Media Regs Are Outdated, Studies Find,
DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 2, 2002, at 14.
140
See CARTER ET AL., supra note 137, at 666–67, 686–89. This rationale would, by
extension, apply to the Internet.
141
See 47 C.F.R. § 73.3555 (1999).
142
See FCC Review of the Commission’s Regulations Governing Television
Broadcasting, Television Satellite Stations and Review of Policy and Rules, 47 C.F.R. pt.
73.
143
See id.; CARTER ET AL., supra note 137, at 612.
144
Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. Fed Communications Comm’n, 280 F.3d 1027, 1033
(D.C. Cir. 2002), amended by 293 F.3d 537 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
137

8 - GATIEN FORMAT

2003]

INTERNET VIDEO DISTRIBUTION AND PROFITS

5/12/03 8:52 AM

939

court set no guidelines for determining what limit would not be
“arbitrary and capricious.”145 However, given both the legislative
and judicial permissiveness evident in the decision not to challenge
the purchase of Chris-Craft by Fox, which resulted in Fox owning
forty-one percent of the national television audience prior to this
decision, it can be inferred that a forty-one percent limit was
tolerable.146 In that same decision, the court also vacated the
cable-broadcast cross-ownership rule,147 under which a single
company could not own a cable television system and a TV station
in the same city, because the court found it “unlikely the [FCC
would] be able on remand to justify retaining it.”148
Presently, FCC Chairman Michael Powell is reviewing all of
the FCC regulations with respect to ownership, and he is leaning
toward deregulation and merger. On October 1, 2002, the FCC
released twelve studies suggesting the abandonment of (1) the
national cap of thirty-five percent on broadcast media ownership
designed to ensure that local audiences receive local programming;
(2) the duopoly rule, because the number of media outlets has
increased by an average of 195 percent since 1960 while the
number of independent owners has increased by 139 percent; and
(3) the cross-ownership rules, despite a survey of the 2000
presidential election which showed that in ten markets where
waivers had been granted, half of the co-owned companies
reported the news with similar bias.149
Following this report, FCC Chairman Powell has fast-tracked
the review of the ownership rules, granting only a thirty-day
extension for public commentary on the studies150 and indicating
145

See id.
See id. at 1036; Jayson Blair, Two Stations, One Tabloid, One Owner, N.Y. TIMES,
July 26, 2001, at B1 (noting the FCC’s approval of Fox’s acquisition of Chris-Craft for
$4.4 billion). This deal allowed Fox to temporarily become the nation’s largest media
owner. At that time, Fox owned two stations in Los Angeles, two in New York, and two
in Phoenix, and had an aggregate total of forty-one percent of the national television
market despite the thirty-five percent FCC ownership limitation. See id.
147
See 47 U.S.C. § 533(a) (2000).
148
Fox Television Stations, 280 F.3d at 1033.
149
See McClintock, supra note 139, at 14.
150
See Pamela McClintock, FCC Extending Deadline for Public Say on Studies, DAILY
VARIETY, Nov. 6, 2002, at 8.
146
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that there is no need for public hearings.151 Critics of Powell’s
approach have called the studies skewed,152 revealing a “deeply
flawed perspective that while ratifying the chairman’s view fails to
adequately assess the realities of the news and entertainment media
marketplace.”153 Powell has consistently defended his position,
stating that the “FCC is committed to achieving its longstanding
goals of diversity, competition and localism in the media and has
taken significant steps to ensure that the public has a full and fair
opportunity to participate.”154 However, Mona Mangan, Executive
Director of the 12,000 member WGA, has expressed concern with
Powell’s genuineness, stating that “[r]adio and television are not
just profit centers for large corporations but are precious national
assets. Our job is to preserve and protect them in the interest of
democracy.”155 With the recent replacement of Senator Fritz
Hollings, D-South Carolina, by Republican Senator John McCain,
R-Arizona, to the chair of the Senate Commerce Committee, it is
almost certain that the ownership rules will be relaxed or
abandoned, as evidenced by his comments that the rules are
“anachronistic” and “unnecessary.”156 The result of all of these
decisions has been the unsurprising but inevitable return to vertical
integration.157
3. The Studios’ Justification
The film studios have justified this return to vertical integration
by citing the increase in the post-theatrical film market (i.e., video,
DVD, video-on-demand, near-video-on-demand, pay-per-view,
151

See Dave McNary, FCC Commish Backs WGA, DAILY VARIETY, Nov. 25, 2002, at 8.
See McClintock, supra note 150, at 31.
153
McClintock, supra note 139, at 1 (quoting Jeffrey Chester of the Center for Digital
Democracy).
154
McClintock, supra note 150, at 31.
155
McNary, supra note 151, at 8.
156
See Brooks Boliek, Regs Rewrite on Fast Track: Senate Power Shift Makes
Ownership Rules Top Priority, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 7, 2002, at 1.
157
One interesting casualty of the deregulation war was Department of Justice antitrust
chief Charles James, who negotiated Microsoft’s controversial antitrust settlement.
James was accused of coming in with a strong case and writing a “softball settlement”
filled with loopholes that gave no effect to curbing Microsoft’s anti-competitive behavior.
Eerily, James later stepped down to become general counsel of ChevronTexaco. See Paul
Davidson, Antitrust Chief to Leave Justice Post, USA TODAY, Oct. 4, 2002, at 2B.
152
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pay TV, free TV, and the syndication market). At first blush, this
reasoning may appear sound. As far back as 1980, worldwide
revenues for video constituted only thirty percent of the projected
theatrical revenues.158 Currently, however, video revenues have
surpassed theatrical revenues for most films,159 and that is where
studios reap the majority of their profits, because their margins are
much higher than for a typical theatrical release.160
The studios’ reasoning finds support in the Chicago school
analysis of vertical integration. This position holds that vertical
integration should be per se legal161 because vertical integration is
either competitively neutral or pro-competitive.162 This kind of
thinking predominated the Reagan era, and under both the Reagan
and Bush Antitrust Divisions, the Department of Justice only
prevented a single vertical merger.163 Ironically, this was the
proposed merger between Showtime and The Movie Channel with
a number of film distributors.164
Additionally, one might argue that because the studios own
their films they have a right to exploit them as they see fit. This
argument finds support under the traditional market ethos that
there is an “Invisible Hand” which regulates market pricing and
availability.165
158

Michael Blaha, Lecture at Southwestern University School of Law (Spring 2002)
(Mr. Blaha is an entertainment attorney and former Vice President of Legal Affairs at
Columbia Pictures).
159
See Tulchin, supra note 48 (stating that in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s worldwide
video revenue surpassed revenue from theatrical distribution and other media).
160
Typically, a theatrical distribution fee is 40%, whereas it effectively varies between
75–92% for home video based on either the “rental” (18–25%), “revenue share” (12–
18%), or “sell-through” (8–12%) models. See MOORE, supra note 16, at 134–35, 140.
161
See Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted
Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8 (1981).
162
See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF
225–31 (1978).
163
See Michael H. Riordan & Steven C. Salop, Evaluating Vertical Mergers: A PostChicago Approach, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 513, 514 (1995).
164
For a detailed discussion of the proposed merger and related antitrust issues, see
Lawrence J. White, Antitrust and Video Markets: The Merger of Showtime and the Movie
Channel As a Case Study, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS AND
TECHNOLOGY 338 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1985).
165
See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., Liberty Classics 1981) (1776) (studying
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4. Is the Studios’ Reasoning Specious?
However, this “gross abdication of responsibility”166 over the
last nineteen years has led to the realization that there are clearly
“situations where vertical mergers and other vertical restraints can
raise significant competitive concerns.”167 This new school of
thought is known as the Post-Chicago School, and although it does
not suggest a return to a per se prohibition of vertical mergers, it
suggests that such mergers be evaluated and enforced on a case-bycase basis to determine if they will have an unreasonable anticompetitive effect.168 Essentially, its critique of the Chicago
School is based on the “[observation] that Chicago style theories of
competitive robustness were based on overly simplistic market
assumptions, including fixed proportions, good information, and
However, the truth remains that
relatively easy entry.”169
“anticompetitive strategic behavior becomes much more plausible
when these assumptions are relaxed.”170

seriously for the first time the nature of capital and the historical development of industry
and commerce).
166
Riordan & Salop, supra note 163, at 514 (quoting Letter from Jack Brooks,
Chairperson of the House Judiciary Committee, to DOJ Assistant Attorney General Anne
Bingaman and FTC Chairperson Janet Steiger (Nov. 4, 1993)).
167
Id. at 515.
168
See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITS PRACTICE 283–89, 329–49 (1994) [hereinafter HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST
POLICY]; Jonathan B. Baker, Recent Developments in Economics That Challenge
Chicago School Views, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 645 (1989); Oliver Hart & Jean Tirole,
Vertical Integration and Market Foreclosure, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC
ACTIVITY, MICROECONOMICS 205 (1990); Eleanor M. Fox & Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Antitrust—Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Coming from? Where Are We
Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 936 (1987); Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A
Review and Critique, 2001 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 257 (2001) [hereinafter Hovenkamp,
Post-Chicago Antitrust]; Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly Power Through
Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515 (1985); Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop,
Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE
L.J. 209, 230 (1986); Janusz A. Ordover et al., Equilibrium Vertical Foreclosure, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 127 (1990); Patrick Rey & Jean Tirole, The Logic of Vertical Restraints, 76
AM. ECON. REV. 921 (1986); Riordan & Salop, supra note 163; Lawrence A. Sullivan,
Post-Chicago Economics: Economists, Lawyers, Judges, and Enforcement Officials in a
Less Determinate Theoretical World, 63 ANTITRUST L.J. 669 (1995); White, supra note
164.
169
See Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust, supra note 168.
170
Id.
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The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of
Justice (DOJ) share responsibility for enforcing antitrust law.171
However, because of their overlapping authority, the two
departments often clash over who will handle particular
mergers.172 This process is not subject to public scrutiny and slows
down by several days the time in which mergers are approved.173
Consequently, the FTC ceded oversight of media and
entertainment industry mergers to the DOJ in an effort to speed up
the clearance process.174
Thereafter, entertainment industry
mergers ran virtually unchecked, totaling an unprecedented 362
mergers and acquisitions worth $49.4 billion in the year 2000.175
Senator Fritz Hollings, then chairperson of the Senate
Appropriations subcommittee and chair of the Senate Commerce
Committee, called the FTC’s practice “illegal” and threatened FTC
Chairperson Tim Muris with slashing the FTC’s budget and
worker salaries in order to “get their full attention.”176 The
Republican-led FCC had even gone so far as to file a formal
appeal, demanding that the recent deregulation of media
conglomerates be reversed,177 but with the recent appointment of
Senator McCain and the Republican takeover of the Senate, the

171

See Brooks Boliek, FTC Faces Holling’s Wrath over DOJ’s Merger Control,
HOLLYWOOD REP., Mar. 20, 2002, at 1, 36.
172
See id.
173
See id.
174
See id.
175
See Year 2000 Media Industry M&A, CLIENT BRIEFING (The Jordan, Edmiston
Group, Inc., New York, N.Y.), Jan./Feb. 2001, http://www.jegi.com/pdf/Jan-Feb%
202001.pdf.
176
Boliek, supra note 171, at 1. Muris defended the deal, claiming that the clearance
process had become too “confrontational and fractious” and that this would allow
antitrust officials to do their job more efficiently. His reasoning is both specious and
suspect. It is specious because the delay is only a few days in a process that can take
several months, and it is suspect because the decision was partially based upon advice
from an outside consultant, Joe Sims, who represents AOL-Time Warner. Hollings noted
the conflict of interest to which Sims responded, “I don’t buy that argument. It obviously
makes no difference to me in my practice if it’s the FTC or DOJ. I get paid whichever
way it goes.” Id. at 36. Hollings, obviously flustered, stated “[t]his administration is
running amok.” Id.
177
See Pamela McClintock, FCC Appeals Media Ruling, DAILY VARIETY, Apr. 22,
2002, at 1, 17.
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threat of a budget slash by the Senate Appropriations Committee
was neutralized.178
Senator Holling’s argument is persuasive, since although more
voices can be heard, those voices are owned by fewer corporations.
In a chilling parallel to the conditions which gave rise to the 1948
divestiture of film studios from exhibition,179 media ownership has
currently been reduced to essentially seven major corporations—
only this time they have even more reach.180
For example, in 1995, the American Broadcast Company
merged with the Walt Disney Corporation in a $19 billion dollar
deal to become ABC-Disney.181 In December 2000, VivendiSeagram-Canal+ became Vivendi-Universal in a merger valued at
$34 billion.182 Then, in 2001, AOL-Time Warner followed suit,
becoming the largest media giant in a merger valued at $106
billion.183
178

See Brooks Boliek, Regs Rewrite on Fast Track: Senate Power Shift Makes
Ownership Rules Top Priority, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 7, 2002, at 1.
179
See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
180
See supra note 13.
181
This $19 billion merger was completed in August 1995, and by the end of the week
their combined value reached $48 billion. See Nancy Gibbs, Easy As ABC: In One
Megadeal, Eisner Turns His Magic Kingdom into a Global Empire and Takes His Sweet
Revenge on a Choir of Critics, TIME, Aug. 14, 1995, at 24.
182
This $34 billion merger was created in December 2000 based on an agreement
announced June 20, 2000. It incorporated Universal Pictures and Universal Music
Group, then owned by Seagram, and gave the media giant control over 9,000 films,
27,000 television episodes, and 750,000 songs. It includes a forty-two percent equity
stake in USA Networks, which includes the Sci-Fi Channel, the Home Shopping
Network, TicketMaster, the Hotel Reservations Network, Gramercy Pictures, and
October Films. See Lori Enos, Vivendi, Seagram and Canal+ to Merge, E-Commerce
Times, at http://www.ecommercetimes.com/perl/story/3601.html (June 20, 2000). It also
includes companies in the areas of film, Internet, music, television, publishing, and
telecoms including, inter alia, MCA, Polygram, Island/Def Jam, Motown, Geffen,
Interscope, and Rising Tide records; United International and Cinema International BV
pictures; VivendiNet, Vizzavi, and Universal Studios New Media Group Internet
services; Multimedia and Brillstein-Grey television entertainment; Havas Press
publishing; and Cegetel and Vivendi telecom for telecom services. See Frontline: The
Merchants of Cool: Media Giants: Vivendi Universal, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/
pages/frontline/shows/cool/giants/vivendi.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2003).
183
This $106 billion merger was completed January 11, 2001, giving the combined
media and Internet giant a $205 billion market capitalization. See Patrick Ross & Evan
Hansen, AOL, Time Warner Complete Merger with FCC Blessing, CNet News, at
http://www.news.com.com/2100-1023-250781.html?legacy=cnet (Jan. 11, 2001).
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These media giants have major holdings in the six principal
media areas: theatrical film, television, cable, telecom, music, and
video. Without even so much as a national media restriction, these
few companies now control both the news and entertainment
media—under the tacit approval of the executive, legislative and
judicial bodies—in order to influence our perceptions of world
events and the content through which we enjoy our free time.
The net effect of these mergers is that the “little guys” are
being drowned out by the “noise” of too many voices; or
insignificant because they will not have the advertising budget
with which to capture the attention of the billion or so netizens
projected to be using the world wide web by 2006.184
For independent film producers, this will likely mean that there
is no real point of entry, and Internet distribution is not likely to
cure this problem. Independent producers will not be able to rent
their films effectively over the Internet unless they do so through
large film companies that have the power to collect revenues, the
visibility to attract consumers, and the wealth to maintain reliable
servers from which consumers can download the videos.
The studios’ reasoning is therefore specious, because the net
result of these mergers is an unprecedented anti-competitive effect.
There will be decreased competition because, in effect, the studios
will once again control all video distribution worldwide, and the
independent producer/distributor’s share will be next to nothing.
The most dramatic testament to the effectiveness of the studios
to eliminate competition with respect to Internet distribution thus
far has been the low-profile failure of Intertainer, the first attempt
at establishing an online video rental outlet.185 Intertainer, which
was launched in 2001, and forced to license its premier films from
the film studios, failed after less than a year, garnering only
147,000 customers and spending nearly all of its $125 million in
venture capital.186 Although Intertainer clearly had problems
licensing quality films, and although some critics charge that its
failure was also due to imperfect streaming and a $7.95 per month
184
185
186

See Internet User Forecast by Country, supra note 1 and accompanying text.
See Fritz, supra note 74.
See id.
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subscription fee, it is worth noting that Intertainer is currently
suing the studios for anti-competitive behavior.187 Moreover, the
agreement between the five studios comprising Movielink to
establish fixed rental prices188 may very well lead to a lawsuit
similar to one recently filed by the states against the recording
industry, which resulted in a $143 million settlement.189
IV.

HOW PIRACY MAY AFFECT PROFIT PARTICIPANTS

Traditionally, studios have exploited both domestic (including
both the U.S. and Canada) and foreign home video markets by
physically shipping videos to content aggregators. This method
was inordinately expensive. It costs approximately three dollars to
make each video cassette,190 excluding the cost of shipping
(airfreight or ground), allowances for damage and piracy, and the
vast infrastructure required to support such a labor intensive model
(including, but not limited to, unions, product tracking, and
independent auditing of sales agents). The U.S. film industry earns
$7.5 billion annually from worldwide distribution.191 Video
distribution accounts for approximately forty percent of this total,
or $3 billion.192 However, these gross revenues are often offset by
losses to video piracy.

187

See Slate Sidebar, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2073743&sidebar=2073744 (last
visited Feb. 8, 2003) (stating that the lawsuit may be “little more than a last-ditch effort to
recoup some cash for investors who bought into a failed Internet business”).
188
See Risky Business? New On-Demand Digital Movies May Not Be Pirate Proof,
supra note 75 (in which the five studios comprising Movielink announce that they have
settled on a rental price of approximately $3.99 per film).
189
See Tamara Conniff, CD Price-Fixing Suit Settled: Labels, Chains to Compensate
States to Tune of $143 Mil, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 1–7, 2002, at 1, 91.
190
This includes the cost of the cassette, billing block stickers, cassette cases, and key
art. Key art is generally created for the theatrical advertising campaign, and billed as a
“theatrical distribution expense.” Later, this art is often re-used on video cassettes, and
the cost is charged again, only now it is billed as a “video distribution expense.” See
DANIELS ET AL., supra note 9, at 65.
191
See ‘Angels’ Take the Cake in Big-Screen Debut, CNN, at http://www.cnn.com/
2000/SHOWBIZ/Movies/11/05/box.office.ap (Nov. 5, 2000).
192
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 311 (S.D.N.Y.
2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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A. On-Line Piracy: The Sum of All Fears
The greatest perceived loss from Internet video distribution is
piracy.193 As reported in Daily Variety, bootleg copies of films on
video, DVD, and VCD cost Hollywood an aggregate total of $1.2
billion in lost revenues in 2001194 the equivalent of one-third of
the entire revenue generated from video distribution worldwide
Moreover, losses in the United States account for $250 million, or
one-twelfth, of that total.195
Under the old model, where videos were physically shipped to
foreign markets, the threat of piracy was significant, yet limited by
language,196 incompatible formats,197 and the cost of maintaining a
piracy ring, which was nearly impossible to do on a global scale.
The Internet, however, threatens to erase each of these limitations.
When video is released on the Internet, anyone at anytime will
be able to download a video if a pirate supplies him or her with a
decryption code. Additionally, unencrypted videos could be
swapped peer-to-peer,198 in effect creating a “Napster for
Movies”199 that could virtually eliminate the video market for a
193

See McClintock, supra note 3, at A9.
See id. (figures broken down as follows: U.S. ($250 million), Russia ($250 million),
China ($160 million), Italy ($140 million), Brazil ($120 million), India ($70 million),
Germany ($70 million), Mexico ($50 million), France ($50 million), and Turkey ($50
million)).
195
See id.
196
Films are either dubbed (a voice over is done by a native speaker in the local
language and the words are synched, as well as possible, to the actor’s lip movement) or
subtitled (the text of the actor’s speech is translated into the local language and placed at
the bottom of the screen for the audience to read as the film plays, but the actor’s words
remain in the original language of the country producing the film).
197
Worldwide video standards include U.S.: NTSC (National Television System
Committee, 525 lines per frame); Europe: PAL (Phase Alternating Line, 625 lines per
frame); France: SECAM (Sequential Color with Memory, 625 lines per frame). See What
Is Standards Conversion, 3D Research Video, at http://www.3dresearch.com/video/
Conversion2.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
198
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1012 (9th Cir. 2001), aff’d,
284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002); Fonovisa, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., No. 3:01-CV-02669, 2002
WL 398676, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2002), Classicberry Ltd. v. Musicmaker.Com, Inc.,
No. 01-CV-1756, 2001 WL 1658241, at *2 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 26, 2001), aff’d, No. 02CV-7054, 2002 WL 31313186 (2d Cir. Oct. 16, 2002).
199
See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 284 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir. 2002) (the final
Napster decision); David Iler, Pirate-Proofing On-Demand Content, COMMUNICATIONS
194
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film overnight. Compared with the projected losses from Internet
video distribution, therefore, the traditional loss figures for piracy
will be child’s play.
Certainly, studios will seek to prevent Internet piracy.200
Senator Joseph Biden, Jr., D-Delaware, chair of the foreign
relations panel, stated “[n]ot to protect it is equivalent to letting
coal be stolen from our mines or water taken from our rivers . . .
[but] how will we preserve the creativity and experimentation that
are America’s inexhaustible oil wells?”201 Senator Biden touches
on perhaps the greatest problem facing Internet distribution: the
perceived notion that a “perfect copy” of a current film released as
a rental, or an older film released to meet the standards of highdefinition television (HDTV), will completely exhaust the studios’
film libraries.202 If past experience with music203 and video204
piracy is any indication, this is a well-founded fear. However,
much to the consternation of film studio executives, recognizing
the problem does not necessarily lead to a solution.
Piracy issues can be broken down into two areas: prevention
and enforcement.

ENGINEERING & DESIGN, Feb. 2, 2002 (expressing the fear of unrestricted video
swapping), http://www.cedmagazine.com/ced/2002/0202/id4.htm; Reuters, supra note
66.
200
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 333, 340
(S.D.N.Y. 2000), aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d
Cir. 2001); David Iler, supra note 199 (providing an excellent analysis of how studios
plan to encrypt videos distributed via broadband Internet).
201
McClintock, supra note 3, at A9.
202
See id.
203
See Ray Bennett, Music Hits Worldwide Sour Note, HOLLYWOOD REP., Apr. 17,
2002, at 5, 48 (stating that according to figures released by the International Federation of
the Phonographic Industry, the worldwide record industry fell five percent in 2001
because of increased piracy).
204
See Bob Sullivan, Net Pirates Poach Harry Potter Film: Film Copied with DV
Camera, Posted in Chat Rooms, MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/834107.asp
(Nov. 13, 2002) (“[O]ne million fans had watched illegal copies of ‘Star Wars: Attack of
the Clones’ over the Internet before it was released in May [2002], and that about two
million people in the United States regularly try to download pirated video.”
Furthermore, the web site vcdquality.com is exclusively dedicated to rating the quality of
pirated films and gives clear indications as to how to locate such films online.).
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1. Preventing Piracy
In order to prevent piracy, the studios have argued for—and
received—high levels of encryption technology.205 Setting a highlevel encryption standard is a relatively simple issue, since it can
be achieved by passing legislation through Congress by an
extremely powerful lobbyist, the film industry. Even so, setting a
stringent encryption standard will not make a downloaded video
theft-proof, because digital pirates often copy films directly off the
screen with digital cameras.206 Although film studios now tag their
pre-screening films with near-invisible identifiers to determine
where the copies were made,207 there have been no resulting
convictions.
Additionally, as Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes
amply illustrates, security systems are vulnerable at the source.208
In Reimerdes, the DVD Content Scrambling System (DeCSS)
encryption used to protect copyrighted works on DVD was broken
by a fifteen-year-old “sleuth” who received an unencrypted DVD
disc because of a factory slip-up.209 In digital video distribution, it
is more likely that the encryption code studios use to protect the
video will be circumvented by an inside job. In such a scenario, a
trusted studio agent copies an unencrypted video and delivers it to
pirates who distribute it to the public. For example, James Cofer, a
trusted security vault manager, was convicted of bribing security
vault guards for access to the unreleased films Armageddon,
Fantasia 2000, and Mighty Joe Young, in order to duplicate the
videos and sell them on the Internet.210 The court fined Cofer
205

See McClintock, supra note 3, at A9 (Jack Valenti, President and CEO of the Motion
Picture Association of America [MPAA], lobbied Capitol Hill, threatening that as long as
studios did not receive assurances that films would have adequate copyright protection
technology, studios would refuse to open their libraries for Internet distribution).
206
See Sullivan, supra note 204 (stating that by using digital video cameras mounted on
tripods in conjunction with handicapped seating that offers headphones for enhanced
hearing, pirates are able to create near-perfect digital reproductions from theater screens
and then post the films to the Internet).
207
See id.
208
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
209
See id.
210
See Legal Briefs, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 20–22, 2000, at 22.
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$1,450, sentenced him to sixty days on a work crew, and placed
him on three years’ probation for his trade secret violation. His codefendant, Gerhard, was sentenced to either 120 days in jail or 60
days on a work crew, and fined $10,900.211
Clearly, encryption is the first line of defense and the studios’
best method for preventing piracy. On Capitol Hill, the battle
rages on as opposing parties attempt to strike a balance between
privatized gain and socialized loss.212 Proponents argue for
stronger encryption to protect copyrighted works and to ensure a
maximum return on profits.213 Opponents, however, argue that
such restrictions violate free speech and the fair use doctrine of the
Copyright Act, and that the anti-circumvention provisions of the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) amount to copyright
misuse by conferring a greater monopoly than was intended by
Congress.214 Others have argued that DMCA’s penalties violate
the Eighth Amendment.215
This dispute is fomenting and bitterly pits the nation’s largest
computer and software producers against Hollywood studios. The
computer companies216 decry government intervention, calling the
211

See id.
See McClintock, supra note 3.
213
See Universal City Studios, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 294.
214
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
215
See Robert Lemos, Protesters Declare War on Copyright Law, CNet News, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1023-272415.html (Aug. 30, 2001) (Lawrence Lessig,
director of Stanford University’s Center for Internet and Society, railed against the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act [DMCA] in what he called “the beginning of a
revolution” at a legal defense fundraiser in the wake of the arrest and sentencing of
Alexander Katalov, the president of Elcon, and Dmitry Sklyarov, for trafficking in a
program designed to circumvent copyright protection for eBooks so that copies could be
made and freely distributed among Internet users. Both pled guilty to five criminal
counts, which could impose a penalty of up to $2.5 million in damages and twenty-five
years in prison.).
216
The alliance that has been forged in order to prevent government imposed encryption
controls includes the RIAA, the Business Software Alliance (comprised, inter alia, of
Microsoft, Apple, Adobe, Symantec, Autodesk, and Macromedia), the Computer Systems
Policy Project (comprised of the CEOs from, inter alia, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, IBM,
Intel, and Unisys), as well as various consumer groups. See Brooks Boliek, High-Tech
Group Targets H’wood: Coalition Seeks to Curtail Copyright Controls on Digital
Devices, HOLLYWOOD REP., Jan. 24–26, 2003, at 4, 51; Associated Press, Net Music
Copyright Deal Reached: Recording Industry, Tech Firms Negotiate Compromise,
MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/859079.asp (Jan. 14, 2003). See also Computer
212
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motion picture industry “the enemy” and claiming that encryption
and “locking controls” placed on personal computers will allow the
government to “lobotomiz[e] our laptops.”217 Hollywood, on the
other hand, has become politically isolated because of its
aggressive support for copyright protection that would “prohibit
the manufacture and distribution of ‘digital media devices’—such
as handheld music players—unless they include governmentapproved copy restriction technology.”218 Although Congress has
thus far legislated in favor of stronger and longer copyright
protection,219 past regulations were instituted under Democratic
leadership. Therefore, if the present Republican majority in the
House and Senate, coupled with Silicon Valley’s seven-figure
lobbying budget, is any indication, Hollywood will have a tough
battle ahead.220
2. Enforcement and Collecting Judgments
Enforcement and collecting judgments are entirely different
matters, each requiring expensive lawyers, the power of the U.S.
court system (which can be slow and unpredictable), and
cooperation from foreign governments who are often unconcerned
with, or indifferent to, American companies’ need to secure
profits.221 One of the greatest problems with enforcement is that
piracy presents a constantly moving target.

Systems Policy Project, at http://www.cspp.org (last visited Mar. 7, 2003); BSA
Members, Business Software Association, at http://www.bsa.org/usa/about/members (last
visited Mar. 7, 2003).
217
Boliek, supra note 216, at 4, 51 (quoting Fred McClure, President of the Alliance for
Digital Progress).
218
Associated Press, supra note 216 (quoting Senator Ernest Hollings).
219
See Commerce and Foreign Trade, 15 C.F.R. pt. 734, Supp. 1 (2000) (U.S. Export
Administration Regulations). See also Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123 S. Ct. 769 (2003).
220
See Boliek, supra note 216, at 4, 51 (describing MPAA President Jack Valenti’s
challenge to Fred McClure to engage in a public debate with respect to this issue).
221
See Cathy Dunkley, Windows of Opportunity: Release Patterns Are Collapsing
Around the World and It’s Making the World Seem Smaller, HOLLYWOOD REP., Oct. 10–
16, 2000, at 18.
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B. Who Are Targets of Piracy? Industrial Age v. Information Age
Big Business, Not the Problem
Traditionally, the bigger the target, the easier it is to prevent
piracy. A larger target is easier to locate, easier to prosecute, and
easier to collect judgments from. This was true in the Industrial
Age, when hard copies (videocassettes) were piracy targets. If a
pirate could obtain an unprotected video, or circumvent both
copyright protection and encryption software, then the pirate could
make and sell tape duplications. In 2000, the entertainment
industry claimed a $35 million dollar loss in domestic video
revenue because of tape piracy, leading to an overall downturn of
seventy percent in gross proceeds when corrected for inflation.222
This form of piracy was also particularly popular abroad, leading
to losses of more than $950 million in 2001.223
For physical distribution of a tangible product, however, pirates
require a large operation: they need tape duplication machines,
they have to purchase tapes, make “knock off” key art versions for
video sleeves, secure warehouses to store the tapes, and ship the
pirated tapes to consumers. All of this requires money, time, and
facilities.
Consequently, for physical copies, the economies of scale
support pirates having larger operations, because the larger they
are, the more efficient their operation will be. Therefore, under the
traditional model, pirates, although harmful, were more easily
controlled because they were bigger targets and easier to find.
Enforcement of Internet distribution is also geared to catching
large-scale operations. For example, the DMCA has “notice and
takedown” provisions, which require any entity accused of
copyright infringement to effectively cease and desist

222

See id. at 18–19 (discussing the burdens and benefits of simultaneous verses
staggered release patterns and the possible effect on overall net revenue for film studios).
223
See McClintock, supra note 3; text accompanying note 195. See also Matthew
Brzezinski, Stopping Russian Theft Is Nyet Easy, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 4, 2002, at A1;
Jeremy Hansen, H.K. (Hong Kong) Chops Piracy: Customs Official Reports 98%
Curtailment, DAILY VARIETY, Oct. 4, 2000, at 9; Tessa Jazmines, Philippine Talent Asks
for Help, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 4, 2002, at A10; Scott Rosenberg, Thai Retailers Busted
for Illegal Goods, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 4, 2002, at A10.
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operations.224 Furthermore, since entities must register with an
online service provider, they will be easier to track and less likely
to be able to maintain a sustained effort.225
1. What About the Little Guys?
In the Information Age, however, individuals present the
greatest threat. This is probably the single most frightening aspect
of modern piracy to copyright holders. With the proper decryption
devices, anyone, anywhere, anytime can obtain a pirated copy of
protected material.226
In 2000, the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)
began to aggressively pursue individual pirates and hired Ranger
Online, a Canadian company that patrols the Internet by sending
out “take down” notices227 to Internet service providers and
individual users in multiple countries and in multiple languages.228
For independent films, the American Film Marketing Association
is the principal enforcement body, and it also employs Ranger
Online, as well as another search engine.229
In 2001,
approximately 54,000 warning notices were sent to individuals

224

See 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(3)(A) (2000); ALS Scan, Inc. v. RemarQ Communities, Inc.,
239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001).
225
See McClintock, supra note 3.
226
See David Clark, Encryption Advances to Meet Internet Challenges, Computer, at
http://www.computer.org/computer/articles/August/technews800.htm (last visited Feb. 8,
2003) (noting that the time to break encryption ranges from 104 years in millions of
instructions per second (MIPS) for RSA/DSA key size of 512 to 1038 years for RSA/DSA
key size of 21,000) (Author’s note: This does not mean it takes 1000 years to break an
encryption of 512; this time is greatly accelerated by larger computers, such as the Kray
computer, or by placing slower computers in serial phase so that they can process the
instructions simultaneously. In this instance, breaking a 512 encryption would take less
than one month).
227
See Ranger Client Testimonials, Ranger Library, at http://www.rangerinc.com/
Library/6-1.shtml (last visited Apr. 16, 2003) (“Ranger has developed a custom search
engine and an automated system for sending out “take down” notices asking Internet
service providers to notify a particular customer of the violation and these notices can
also can go directly to Internet users.”).
228
See McClintock, supra note 3, at A9–A10.
229
See id. at A10.
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downloading films from the Internet, a number that is projected to
double in 2002.230
Ranger Online (hereinafter “Ranger”) works in the following
way: (1) studios or independent producers—“indies”—submit a
list of titles to Ranger; (2) Ranger searches Internet chat rooms and
sites from which these titles can be downloaded, (3) the MPAA
issues “warning notices” based on the search results, and (4) with
very few exceptions, the piracy stops.231 In 2001, there were only
two challenges to the 54,000 warnings issued.232 For the most part,
this success is attributable to the fact that the persons targeted are
not generally considered to be criminals, so a simple warning will
suffice.233
C. How, and Where, Can the Pirates Be Stopped?
1. Domestic Jurisdiction
Previously, it was thought that “[c]racking down on piracy in
the United States is relatively straightforward when it comes to
legal authority,”234 because, under recent copyright law, anyone
who downloads and hosts a protected file on a home computer
faces federal prosecution regardless of whether he or she seeks
financial gain.235
In the past, media companies have successfully prosecuted: (1)
a fifteen-year-old hacker who cracked DeCSS;236 (2) a Princeton
computer science professor who wanted to post a decryption
230

See id. at A9 (the 54,000 bearing a 2001 postmark were distributed as follows: U.S.
(36,000); Europe, Middle East, and Africa (9,000); Canada (7,000); and Latin America
(89)). This author notes as significant that the problem is much greater in Latin America
than the numbers convey, perhaps because the program utilized by Ranger Online only
recently became able to search in multiple languages.
231
See id. at A10.
232
See id.
233
See id.
234
Id.
235
See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000) (the Digital Millennium Copyright Act’s anticircumvention provision); Jason Hoppin, The Crackdown on IP Crime, RECORDER, Dec.
3, 2001, http://www.law.com/regionals/ca/stories/edt1203a.shtml.
236
See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000),
aff’d sub nom. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
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algorithm on the web,237 and (3) random college students
downloading pirated videos from the web.238 However, recent
case law has called into doubt the effectiveness of legal authorities
to prosecute such copyright crimes. Most recently, in November
2002, the California Supreme Court ruled that the real party in
interest, the California based DVD Copy Control Association,
could not sue a Texas resident in California for posting DeCSS on
the Internet.239 This ruling was based on the majority’s holding
that the defendant, Matthew Pavlovich, did not have sufficient
minimum contacts with the forum state.240 Therefore, allowing the
suit to proceed in California would have been tantamount to
allowing all plaintiffs connected to the auto industry to sue
defendants in Michigan merely because the industry is based
there.241 In light of the “effects test” set forth in Calder v. Jones,242
the future legitimacy of this ruling will likely be called into
question and the exercise of personal jurisdiction over future
defendants will likely turn upon the defendant’s intent.
2. Foreign Jurisdiction
Enforcement in foreign jurisdictions presents a much greater
problem. First, enforcement in this context is more a matter of
237

See Hoppin, supra note 235. The music industry challenged Prof. Felten to crack its
proposed CD protection. Felten succeeded, and when he wanted to present his findings,
the RIAA threatened to sue him. Id. He sued for declaratory relief in order to present his
findings and lost. See Final Hearing Transcript, Felten v. Recording Indus., (D.N.J 2001)
(01-CV-2669),
http://www.eff.org/Legal/Cases/Felten_v_RIAA/20011128_hearing_
transcript.html.
238
See Hoppin, supra note 235 (discussing how Jason Spatafore was arrested by the
U.S. Attorney’s office and placed on two years probation for downloading a pirated copy
of STAR WARS: EPISODE I—THE PHANTOM MENACE (Twentieth Century Fox 1999),
splitting it into several smaller files and reposting it on his own web site). In this case,
the government had no trouble haling the defendant into court in California despite his
status as a citizen of Arizona and despite his claims that he did not know he was breaking
the law. Id.
239
See Pavlovich v. Super. Ct., 58 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2002).
240
See id. at 11–12 (noting that Pavlovich’s sole contact with California was his
company’s Internet web posting; Pavolvich did not live, work, own property, transact, or
direct his business activity toward California).
241
See id. at 13; Chris Marlowe, Antipiracy Ruling Sets Precedent: California’s
Supreme Court Tackles Jurisdiction Question, HOLLYWOOD REP., Nov. 27, 2002, at 3, 18.
242
465 U.S. 783 (1984).
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political negotiation than law.
Therefore, to help combat
international video piracy, the MPAA has set up an extra-judicial
worldwide Internet enforcement group.243 This group consults
with a former U.S. Department of Justice attorney who is wellversed in computer crime, and lobbies the U.S. trade representative
to help “make sure trading nations are doing their part tracking
down and prosecuting pirates.”244 Additionally, the MPAA is
“pushing legislation that would give President Bush authority to
strike trading treaties without getting prior approval from
Congress.”245 Whether this approach will be more or less
successful than enforcing traditional court orders through treaty
signatories remains to be seen.
D. Keeping Score: Recent Successes and Failures
At present, the anti-piracy landscape resembles a battlefield,
with casualties on both sides. On the domestic front, although
Adobe had already prevailed in its civil suit,246 a jury in the United
243

See McClintock, supra note 3, at A10.
Id.
245
Id.
246
Adobe Systems successfully prosecuted the Russian software company, Elcomsoft,
for publishing software that converts copy-protected eBooks into postscript document
format [PDF] documents which can easily be printed, copied, and distributed by Internet
users, despite the fact that the software had legitimate uses. Adobe’s fear was that the
Advanced eBook Processor (which removes restrictions on reading and printing from
encrypted PDF files) would be used to make illegal copies of eBooks, which could be
distributed through “Napster-like” file sharing networks. Adobe’s Anti-Piracy Division
forced Elcomsoft to remove its web site from the Internet, and stop selling the product
from RegNow (a division of Digital River). See Adobe and the eBook Pirates: Adobe
Threatens
Software
Developer
over
eBook
Conversion
Software,
at
http://publishing.about.com/library/weekly/aa070501a. htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
The feds later arrested Elcomsoft’s security expert, Dimitry Sklyarov, at Defcon, the
annual hacker’s convention in Las Vegas, after he delivered his presentation, eBook
Security: Theory and Practice, which outlined the shortcomings of eBook security. The
basis for the arrest were alleged violations of the DMCA. See John Leyden, eBook
Security Debunker Arrested by Feds, Register, at http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/
55/20444.html (July 17, 2001).
Mr. Sklyarov’s arrest sparked mass protests by free speech advocates, such as the
Electronic Frontier Foundation [EFF], which quickly became a public relations disaster
for Adobe. Adobe dropped all charges against Mr. Sklyarov in July 2001, and the
Department of Justice dropped criminal charges in December 2001 in exchange for his
testimony against his employer, ElcomSoft. See Hoppin, supra note 235.
244
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States District Court for the Northern District of California
acquitted Russian software firm Elcomsoft of criminal charges of
violating the DMCA by selling a $99 program that allowed users
to make copies of eBooks247 that had been digitally encrypted.248
In January 2003, however, the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia handed a victory to copyright holders by
ruling that a subpoena on Internet web service provider Verizon to
reveal the names of their customers who are allegedly liable for
copyright infringement was constitutionally enforceable under the
DMCA.249
Internationally, courts have been equally divided. On January
7, 2003, in a unanimous twenty-five-page ruling, the Oslo City
Court in Norway acquitted defendant Jon Lech Johansen of
creating a program to crack the DeCSS so that he could play a
DVD on his Linux-based computer.250 Interestingly, the case was
prosecuted as a data break-in rather than as a copyright violation,
leading Johansen to defend his act of circumvention by stating that
“[a]s long as you have purchased a DVD legally, then you are
247

An eBook is simply a downloadable version of a book that can be read on handheld
devices and personal computers. See eBooks, Paradigm Red Shift, at http://www.
paradigm-redshift.com/ebooks.htm (last visited Feb. 9, 2003).
248
See United States v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111 (N.D. Cal. 2002). See also
Associated Press, IT Firm Cleared in Copyright Case, Sci-Tech, at http://news.ninemsn.
com.au/Sci_Tech/story_44118.asp (Dec. 23, 2002) (stating that Elcomsoft could have
been fined $2 million plus penalties if willfulness had been proven); Reuters, Russian
Firm Cleared in U.S. Digital Copyright Trial, CNet News, at http://news.cnet.com/
investor/news/newsitem/0-9900-1028-20758904-0.html (Dec. 17, 2002 ) (“We accept the
jury’s verdict. . . . While disappointed, we are also pleased the judge upheld the
constitutionality of the [DMCA] and the jurisdiction of the United States to bring these
cases.” (quoting Kevin Ryan, U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of California)); Paul
Sweeting, Acquittal in C’right Trial, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 20, 2002, at 24 (stating that
the MPAA and Adobe had declined to comment on the verdict); Russian Firm Innocent
in Copyright Case, United Press International, at http://www.upi.com/view.cfm?
StoryID=20021217-042812-2354r (Dec. 17, 2002) (“Today’s jury verdict sends a strong
message to federal prosecutors who believe that tool makers should be thrown in jail just
because a copyright owner doesn’t like the tools they build.” (quoting Fred von
Lohmann, an intellectual property lawyer with the EFF)).
249
See In re Verizon Internet Servs., Inc., No. 02-CV-0323, 2003 WL 141147, *17
(D.D.C. Jan. 21, 2003); Justin Oppelaar, Pirates Face Music, Verizon Must Reveal
Swappers’ ID, Judge Sez, DAILY VARIETY, Jan. 22, 2003, at 8.
250
See Associated Press, Teen Acquitted in DVD Hack Case: Norwegian Court Deals
Blow to Hollywood’s Copyright Fight, MSNBC, at http://www.msnbc.com/news/856102.
asp (Jan. 7, 2003).
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allowed to decode it with any equipment and can’t be forced to buy
any specific equipment.”251 Prosecutors have since appealed the
ruling.252 Conversely, on January 23, 2002 in the United
Kingdom, the High Court, Chancery Division, held that Sony had
established liability for circumventing the DVD CSS under section
296 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1998, after
defendant Edmunds of Channel Technology had imported from
Russia and sold the “Messiah” chip, which allows pirated games
and pornography to be played on Sony’s Playstation 2.253
E. Non-Legal Solutions: Establishing a Piracy Equilibrium
Due to the difficulty in tracking down and enforcing judgments
in a global environment, the most apt solution is likely to fall
outside the legal realm. This solution, based on sound business
principles and common sense, is governed by the principle that
people will not expend great effort or suffer the threat of legal
consequences if they can receive a product at a reasonable price.
Therefore, it is necessary for film studios to strike a reasonable
balance of interests by reducing prices to the point at which their
losses to piracy will be tolerable yet they will still receive a
reasonable return on their investment, thus creating a “piracy
equilibrium.”
The first steps toward a piracy equilibrium have already been
established. On November 11, 2002, MGM, Paramount, Sony
Pictures Entertainment, Universal, and Warner Bros. launched
Movielink as a practical, legal alternative to piracy.254 The
251

Id.
See Associated Press, Alleged DVD Hacker’s Acquittal to Be Appealed, USA
TODAY, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/2003-01-20-dvd-appeal_x.htm
(Jan. 20, 2003).
253
See Sony Computer Enter. v. Owen, [2002] E.M.L.R. 34, at 744–45 (Ch. 2002).
254
See Marlowe & Bond, supra note 72 (in which Josh Bernoff, Forrester Research
principal analyst is said to believe that Movielink resulted from “fears of the possible
Napsterization of the film industry”); Fritz, supra note 74 (stating “Movielink’s primary
purpose, as some people involved in the project admit, is to demonstrate that the studios
are providing a legal alternative for Internet movie pirates.”); Sullivan, supra note 204
(stating Movielink is “a legal alternative to pirate film downloading”); Risky Business?
New On-Demand Digital Movies May Not Be Pirate Proof, supra note 75 (stating that
Movielink’s planned encryption technology, high-quality video, and low download fees
would help to prevent the e-piracy of such films as LARA CROFT: TOMB RAIDER
252
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purpose was to unify the fight against online piracy, founded on
the belief that people would choose to be law-abiding if presented
with a reasonable alternative.255 This realistic approach may help
solve the immediate problem of piracy by reducing the incentive
for netizens to seek out unauthorized copies.
However,
establishing a piracy equilibrium and ensuring studios the right and
ability to rent their videos directly to the public under the new
distribution model does not ensure that Talent will receive
equitable treatment. In a typical studio contract, Talent bargains
for gross participation and residuals.256
F. What Piracy Means for Talent Participants
Piracy presents a threat to both studios and Talent. It undercuts
their mutual financial base and threatens the very core of creative
productivity protected by the U.S. Constitution.257
While this author supports strong encryption and cannot
condemn piracy enough,258 gloomy predictions that piracy will
destroy the industry have not come true, even though perfect
digital copies of music have been available for over ten years.
Therefore, piracy really presents a threat profit participants
because studios will likely treat piracy as a breakage allowance
deducted from gross receipts, and pass the loss on to the profit
participants. This is especially true if the income is calculated
after receipts are taken from an inter-company affiliate distributor.
If the affiliate distributes the video over the Internet, the affiliate

(Paramount 2001), PLANET OF THE APES (Twentieth Century Fox 2001), and PEARL
HARBOR (Touchstone 2001) which occurred within days of their theatrical premieres).
255
See id. While encryption technology experts believe the Windows-based format is
vulnerable to piracy and that it would be relatively simple to capture the films
permanently, Warner Brothers CEO Barry Meyer said in this article that he believes
“human nature is not predisposed towards piracy.”
256
Gross participations are bargained-for, whereas, if the picture is made by a guild
signatory, minimum percentages based on gross profits for international video are
established by the respective guilds: i.e., the WGA, DGA, and SAG in their respective
Minimum Basic Agreements. See, e.g., WGA, supra note 17, at 161–71 (1998). See also
Tulchin, supra note 48.
257
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
258
See Konrad Gatien, How Encryption and National Security Will Affect the Future of
Digital Film Distribution, 8 SW. J.L. & TRADE AM. 229 (2001).
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will not incur the loss; rather, it will keep its share of rentals and
report the loss to the studio. The studio will then write this loss
down against the deemed royalty posted to gross receipts that are
figured into profit participations. Therefore, this model will t
allow the studio to sequester the lion’s share of gross receipts in its
affiliate, and then write down the royalties it receives from its
affiliate by the amount lost to piracy. Again, the risk and the loss
will be passed on to those least able to shoulder the burden—the
Talent—while the studios will have successfully insulated
themselves from harm through superior bargaining power and
clever business models.
CONCLUSION
In 2000, the annual cost for the physical distribution of all
films worldwide from all studios was $1.5 billion—approximately
twenty percent of reported gross revenues. The loss from content
aggregator agreements is equally significant.259
Under the
traditional model, studios were forced to continue these
debilitating relationships; that is, it was impractical for studios to
open their own distribution networks because consumers would
demand greater freedom of choice. However, in the Information
Age, this concern has vanished. Now, the greatest concerns are
quality and speed. Telecom companies, in association with the
major motion picture studios, are rushing to solve both
problems.260 Congress has also been proactive in legislating and
providing funds to help private companies grapple with change.261
Certainly, standards will be set. It won’t be long before microfast broadband carrying a compressed digital signal will be linked
to high definition television in the home. Propelled by strong
economic incentives, the movement towards video distribution via
259

See WAYNE LEVIN, MOTION PICTURE PRODUCTION LAW 17 (2002).
See Cameron Hurst, True Video on Demand Is Possible over the Internet . . . Really!,
Home Toys, at http://www.hometoys.com/htinews/oct01/articles/uniview/hurst.htm (Oct.
2001).
261
See Broadband Internet Access Act of 2003, H.R. 267, 108th Cong. (2003). See also
Doug Johnson, Tech Policy in 2002, Vision, at www.ce.org/publications/vision/2002/
aprmayjun/p5.asp?bc=bak&year=2002 (last visited Feb. 8, 2003).
260
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the Internet is powerful. The traditional method of physical
distribution required a vast infrastructure and was costly,
cumbersome, and remarkably inefficient.
Digital video
distribution, on the other hand, requires only that the studio
maintain enough servers to make their films available to the public
I It is therefore potentially much more lucrative.
The awful truth is that “only about 5% of the major
studio/distribution deals actually result in the payment of net
profits to anyone, regardless of how much money the film makes
(that’s the best estimate of a profit participation auditor who is out
there on the front lines every day, auditing the studio books).”262
With unprecedented media conglomeration, the current situation
puts unequal bargaining power together with an obligation of
fairness toward others, and in to the hands of those least likely to
exercise it.
This blatant profit-reaping by film studios is similar to the
Robber Barons of the late 1800s and early 1900s who President
Theodore Roosevelt called the “malefactors of great wealth.”263
These men, C. Vanderbilt, Jay Gould, J.P. Morgan and Jacob
Schiff, have been characterized by historians as “masters of trick
and deceit,” and as “Mephistopheles,” men who practiced “pillage,
fraud, and distortion.”264 Their flagrant abuse of power led
Roosevelt to adopt “a public and political role for the government
in antitrust [to] control, curb, and break-up large private
concentrations of economic power.”265
If past behavior is any indication, the studios are likely to
continue to act monopolistically, even if the courts have not yet
examined, and attorney generals not yet prosecuted their practices
under the strict letter of the law. Studios are unlikely to report
profits accurately. Instead they will force weaker bargaining
parties with legitimate claims into an occasional settlement, rather
262

JOHN W. CONES, THE FEATURE FILM DISTRIBUTION DEAL (1996).
J. Bradford DeLong, Robber Barons, at http://econ161.berkeley.edu/Econ_Articles/
carnegie/delong_moscow_paper2.html (Jan. 1, 1998).
264
Negative Stereotype of the “Robber Baron”, at http://history.sandiego.edu/gen/soc/
robber-barons.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2003) (citing MATTHEW JOSEPHSON, THE ROBBER
BARONS (1938)).
265
DeLong, supra note 263.
263
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than distribute what could be fairly substantial profits to all Talent
participants industry-wide.
In conclusion, because it is not in the studios’ financial interest
to be generous, or to ensure that profits are distributed equitably,
both the legislature and the courts must step in to ensure that
studios live up to their contractual obligations of good faith and
fair dealing. A net profit definition that results in no profit is
manifestly unjust, causes unnecessary litigation, wastes judicial
resources, and may dry up the Talent pool for the future.266

266

See JAMES JAEGER, THE INDEPENDENT PRODUCER’S MANUAL (1998).

